Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 19
Issue 3 Issue 3 - June 1966

Article 7

6-1966

Notes: The Role of the American Corporation in the Economic
Development of Latin America:
James H. Hancock

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons

Recommended Citation
James H. Hancock, Notes: The Role of the American Corporation in the Economic Development of Latin
America:, 19 Vanderbilt Law Review 757 (1966)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol19/iss3/7

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information,
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

NOTES
The Role of the American Corporation in the
Economic Development of Latin America: A Study
of the Conflict Between the Extra-Territorial
Application of United States Antitrust Laws and
United States Foreign Policy*
I. INTRODUCTION
Following the turn of the last decade, the emergence of new
European commercial powers with-antitrust philosophies different from
our own gave rise to concern over the potential for conflict between
the application of our antitrust laws and our foreign relations.' In
1964, following almost two years of hearings,2 the Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly dispelled most of that
concern by reporting that the United States antitrust laws did not
threaten to disrupt our political or commercial relations with the
industrial nations of Europe.3 Yet some concern still exists over the
potential for conflict between our antitrust policies and our foreign
policies toward the underdeveloped countries in our own hemisphere.

4

*This note received the Edmund Morgan Prize for the best student article submitted
to this Review during the current year.
1. The Rome Treaty, 298 U.N.T.S. 14 (1958), spotlighted the problem which had
already begun to draw attention. See, e.g., BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMEMCAN
Busnmss ABROAD (1958); FUGATE, FoRmGN COMMERCE AND Tn ANTIrUST LAWs
(1958). See also Loevinger, Antitrust in the Modern World, 6 A.B.A. SEC. INT. COMP.
L. 20, 30-31 (1961), pointing out the principal differences in antitrust philosophy
between the United States and Western Europe. Evidently the United States is in
favor of economic decentralization, see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294 (1962), while the countries of Western Europe are moving in the opposite direction.
See Rome Treaty, supra, arts. 85 ("concerted practices") and 86 ("abuse of dominant
market position"); Council Regulation No. 17, as amended, [1962] Journal Officiel
des Communaut'es Europ~ennes 204; Adelman, Problems and Prospects in Antitrust
Policy II, PERSPECTIVES ON ANTTRUST PoIacy 46 (Phillips ed. 1965).
2. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate
Committee on the judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) [hereinafter cited as Hart
Committee Hearings]; Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) [hereinafter
cited as Kefauver Committee Hearings].
3. S. RES. 262, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). For comment on the impact of this
report see Day & Bodner, Developments in Antitrust During the Past Year, 28 A.B.A.
ANTTRUST SEC. 3, 117 (1965).
4. Brewster, The Influence of International Factors, PERSPECTIVES ON ANTrrRUST
POLICY 366 (Phillips ed. 1965); Friedmann, Antitrust Law and Joint International
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This potential for conflict results from two principal phenomena.

First, private American concerns are necessarily playing an ever

increasing role in our programs to aid and assist developing nations.5

As private American concerns enter this endeavor the extent to
which they may cooperate with each other and with foreign interests

becomes a major business problem-a problem which cannot be resolved without reference to American antitrust legislation. Second,
the expanding European industrial powers are beginning to take part
in this endeavor. 6 The resultant bilateral effort by American and
degree of equivalence
European businessmen suggests a need for some
7

in the antitrust standards applicable to each.

This note will examine the potential conflict between United States'

antitrust policy and United States' foreign policy in Latin America.
As background, Part II will provide a brief discussion of the United
States' foreign policy objective in Latin America. In Part III, the
discussion will turn to the most likely context for conflict-the potentials of the American corporation for advancing that foreign policy
objective. Part IV will illustrate how the possibility of extra-territorial

application of United States' antitrust laws gives rise to the potential
for conflict between those laws and the United States' foreign policy
in Latin America. Part V will examine the most likely context for
conflict and determine whether a conflict actually exists. Finally,

Part VI will define the nature of the actual conflict and suggest a
resolution.

II. Tim

FOREIGN POLICY OBjECrIVE-THE ECONOMIC

AmERICA
United States foreign policy is clear in at least one respect; the
economic development of the backward nations of Latin America is
one of our foremost objectives.8 This foreign policy objective is not
DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN

Business Ventures in Economically Underdeveloped Countries, 60 COLUM. L. Rv.
780 (1960) (the problems raised therein were not answered by the 1964 report).
5. Dean, Statement before the Congressional hearings, Hart Committee Hearings 66.
This result is almost inevitable, see notes 55 & 56 infra and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Wall Street Journal, Jan. 24, 1966, p. 22, col. 2 (French investment
in Puerto Rico); Wall Street Journal, Jan. 4, 1966, p. 6, col. 2 (British investment in
Brazil); Wall Street Journal, Dec. 27, 1965, p. 2, col. 5 (British and Dutch investment
in Argentina).
7. "In view of the likelihood of increase in capital export to underdeveloped nations
in the future 'approximation of equivalent antitrust standards between such countries
as the United States, Canada, and the Nations of Western Europe will become more
and more important.'" Friedman, supra note 4, at 790. See note 1 supra for discussion
of the present lack of equivalence.
8. 1963 President Kennedy's Budget Message, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1962, § 1, p. 1,
col. 17; Interview with Harold B. Levin, Division of Restrictive Business Practices,
U.S. State Department, in Washington, D.C., Dec. 29, 1965. This is not merely a
national objective: "the economic progress of the underdeveloped nations is one of
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motivated solely by the immediate economic, 9 political 0 and strategic"

value of continued amicable relations with these countries but reflects a broader goal-the increase of all world trade and a more
2
favorable allocation of the productive resources of the world.1
In order to understand how the United States may advance this
foreign policy objective, some understanding of the problems facing

these underdeveloped nations and the solutions to those problems is
essential. Yet the road to economic development is paved with a
multitude of pitfalls; the nature and extent of these hazards vary
substantially from one Latin American country to another. For that

reason alone, generalizations are subject to criticism. Yet any attempt
to deal with the development of the economically backward countries

of Latin America within the scope of a law review note is bound to
produce generalities. 13 On the other hand, a failure to consider the
the paramount international problems of our time." Fnm &rN& PuGH, LEGAL AsPEcTS
oF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS (1959). The present administration is attempting to encourage
the countries of Europe to take a larger part in reaching this objective, Wall Street
Journal, Jan. 14, 1966, p. 6, col. 1.
9. The foreign commerce segment of American business has experienced its fastest
growth since 1955; during that period, its importance to the American economy has
grown correspondingly. Celler, A Congressman'sView of the Foreign Commerce Aspects
of the Sherman Act, Symposium on Trade Associations, 27 A.B.A. ANrrrusT SEC.
1, 3 (1965). The underdeveloped nations of the world have supplied a major portion
of the sources of supply and market expansion which have made this growth in
United States foreign commerce possible, MoussA, THE UNDERPRIVILEGED NATIONS 17172 (1962); Monthly Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, May-June
1965, p. 7 (table 3).
10. "The ideological, military, political, and economic challenge the United States
now faces requires a reappraisal of inherited concepts, policies and laws. What we do
makes more difference to the rest of the world than it ever did before. The conduct
of our foreign business and our policies with respect to it are a not insignificant part
of this picture." BRWsma, op. cit. supra note 1, at 3. However, the efficacy, as a
political tool, of economic assistance to the underdeveloped nations is questionable. The
political gains, if any, are slow to accrue. Most underdeveloped nations accept all
hands extended in their direction. Their non-commital politics are justified on a
theory something like this: "If an underdeveloped country receives assistance toward
financing its investment from both sides the two efforts do not cancel one another out,
but reinforce one another. Other things being equal development takes place more
rapidly, as does trade, and the two groups of industrial countries are simultaneously
creating the possibility of commercial expansion for both of them." MoussA, op. cit.
supra note 9, at 178.
11. The strategic significance of the underdeveloped countries of Latin America in
terms of materials necessary to national defense, communication routes, and land mass
is obvious. See Dean, supra note 5, at 80-82. For example COMSAT recently expressed
the necessity for satellite tracking stations in Puerto Rico, Wall Street journal, March
14, 1966, p. 4, col. 3.
12. Economists would use the expression, "international division of labor." However,
that expression covers a broader area than a non-economist might expect. The
objective is the promotion of international specialization, with a resultant free flow of
goods, services, labor and capital throughout the world. See 1 KnMscEmN, POLICY IN
OuR Tnvm 12-13 (Kirschen ed. 1964).
13. The danger of generalization is its tendency to mislead. By staying close to the
basics, this note will attempt to avoid this tendency.
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nature of our foriegn policy objective would produce an inadequate
appreciation of considerations relevant to any resolution of a conflict
between that policy and our antitrust policies should such a conflict
exist. Any approach must be at best a compromise.

A. The Problem-The Underdeveloped Countries of Latin America

4

Of the many and varied economic problems facing the individual
Latin American nations, three appear to be fundamental. All of
these countries suffer from a low standard of living, industrial stagnation, and a low level of agricultural production.'5
Most of these countries can trace the cause of their low standard

of living16 to their early, colonial development. Colonial overlords

collected the meager profits and promptly sent them over-seas to their
king or queen; reinvestment for the economic growth of the colony
was non-existent. 17 The longer-lasting inability to disengage these
colonial bonds resulted in a problem of greater proportions than that
14. Geographically Latin America includes the countries of Central and South America,
a sizable area. Yet these countries are only representative of a much larger problem.
The underdeveloped nations of the world cover over one third of the earth's land mass,
KRAusF ECONOMIC DEvELoPmETr 7-8 (figure 1) (1961). In terms of population the
problem is equally broad, MEADE, WAR ON WANT 6 (1962). Moreover, the current
prognosis is for the problem to increase unless intervening factors turn the tide. The
prevailing low rate of economic growth, together with a high rate of population growth,
promises a decline in per capita income in most of the world's underdeveloped countries.
See DORB, ECoNoImfic GROWTH AND UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES 19, 21, 37-40 (1965);

1964 U.N. STA-TSICAL YEAnnoorc (table 2). For definition of "per capita income" see
note 16 infra.
15. REPORT No. 7811 of the Subcommittee on Inter-American Economic Relationships of the Joint Economic Committee, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. passim (1962) [hereinafter cited as 1962 REPORT].
16. Developmental economics is itself a recent development, ELLSWOnT, THE INTERNAT OxAL ECONOMY 463-64 (1958), and economists are not yet in complete accord

regarding terminology. Ellsworth calls this first basic problem a low level of material
welfare. Id. at 462. While most economists use the term "low per capita income," see,
e.g., KRAUSF, op. cit. supra note 14, at 6-7; STEN, POLIcIEs FOR TRADE AND DEv1.Lop-

m-,r 7 (1964), Ellsworth's terminology does emphasize the effect of this economic
phenomenon on the material welfare of the inhabitants of underdeveloped countries.
For example, as the per capita income decreases caloric intake per person, protein
consumption, literarcy and percentage of current income invested all tend to decrease;
at the same time infant mortality and population density tend to increase. ELLSWORTH1,
op. cit. supra, at 463 (table 26.1).
The non-economist will need a definition of terms if this discussion is to have much
meaning. Economists measure a country's level of economic development in terms of
gross national produce (GNP); that is, the total value of all goods and service produced
by the public and private sector of the economy. SAMUELSON, EcoNoMNcs 243 (1st

ed. 1948). The gross national product may be measured on an absolute basis-not
relative to any other quantum-or it may be measured on a per capita basis-relative
to the population of the country. Economists find a country's per capita income by
dividing the gross national product by the population. This latter measure is the
more meaningful of the two in terms of economic development since it correlates with
the material welfare of the people.
17. DOBB, op. cit. supra note 14, at 17.

NOTES
experienced by the United States after its brief colonial conception. 18
Other factors have helped to perpetuate the problem. When colonialism ended, foreign nations continued to invest in these countries
according to their own needs. While foreign control no longer existed,
the novelty of independence blinded many of the new governments to
the need for controlling foreign investment. Thus neo-colonialism
tended to thwart the economic growth of these countries even after

colonialism ended. 19 In addition, a lack of domestic capital prevented

these countries from helping themselves with investment according

to their own needs.20 Thus fate has played havoc with these countries;
suffering from economic exploitation from without and a lack of

capital within, they have been unable to raise their standard of
living and in some cases have been unable to stop its decline. 21

The present low level of industrial development2 also emanated
from colonialism. The colonizing countries tended to exploit only the
most obvious potentials of the Latin America colonies. Since the
principal attraction of most of these colonies was an abundant supply
of one or two natural resources,2 colonial industry was limited to
the extraction of these primary2 products 5 The other needs of the
colony were either supplied by a subsistence type of production or
imported from the colonizing country. This dependence upon principal raw materials has continued to the present,26 primarily due to
18. While the colonial bonds on the United States fell loose in 1776, many Latin
American countries remained under colonial rule until the late nineteenth century.
19. DOBB, op. cit. supra note 14, at 18.
20. Gunwald, Why Not Invest in Latin America?, Harv. Bus. Rev., Nov.-Dec. 1963,
p. 123. This shortage is beginning to ease. Individuals are gradually accumulating
savings and are beginning to invest them. However, this source of capital is too
widely spread to be effectively utilized for economic development. Moreover, the
nouveau riche of Latin America apparently prefer to invest in the securities of
developed nations like the United States rather than risk their wealth in an investment
for the future of their own shaky economies. See Wall Street Journal, April 14, 1966,
p. 22, col. 2.
21. KRAusE, op. cit. supra note 14, at 20-22.
22. Most economists view the expansion of production as the basis for economic
growth. In fact, they usually measure economic growth in terms of the rate of change
in the GNP, see note 16 supra. Measured on a year-to-year basis the rate of change in
the GNP gives some indication of how rapidly production is expanding. However,
this absolute measure may be misleading. For example, in 1963 the rate of growth in
Brazil's GNP was 1.1%. However, when adjusted to account for a population growth
of 3.4% in that same year, Brazil's per capita income actually decreased at a rate of
1.8%. Gilbert, New Latin Tempo, Barron's Magazine, Oct. 4, 1965, p. 9. For this
reason many economists prefer to measure the rate of economic growth in terms of the
rate of change in the per capita income.
23. KaAusE, op. cit. supra note 14, at 47-48.
24. "Primary" is used here in its technical economic sense meaning products incorporating few or no factors of production other than raw materials. Crude oil, mineral ores
in the rav or semi-refined state are examples of primary products.
25. DOBB, op. cit. supra note 14, at 17; KRAusE, op. cit. supra note 14, at 66-67.
26. 1962 Report. For example, consider the dependence of the following countries
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the interaction of neo-colonialism 27 and a lack of domestic technology,
managerial expertise and investment capital.28
The early colonial development had its most lasting and economically crippling effect upon Latin American agriculture. During
that period, agricultural production took place primarily on large
estates belonging to foreign overlords.2 9 Independent agriculture,
on the product in parentheses: Bolivia (tin); Brazil (coffee); Chile (copper); Costa
Rica (coffee). The extent of Latin American industry's emphasis on production of
primary goods is apparent from the following table compiled from the information in
1963 U.N. STAnsTncAL YEARBOOK 62-63 (table 11):
Rest of World
Cap
Latin America
Nature of Product
8
125
117
(1) food & tobacco
10
141
131
(2) metal products
(crude ore)
(4)
158
162
(3) metal products
(semi-refined)
11
143
154
(4) electricity & gas
(5) coal, crude petroleum,
14
147
133
basic chemicals & rubber
15
126
111
(6) textiles, clothing & leather
16
144
128
(7) manufactured products
(8) non-metalic mineral products25
118
143
refined
In explanation, the figures represent an index of the 1963 level of production relative
to that in 1958 of 100. The products have been arranged in order from the most
primary to the more complex. The chart shows Latin America's production level
falling further and further behind that of the rest of the world as the production
process becomes more complex. The apparent oddity of the third entry is the result
of the emphasis of the colonial period on the colonial production of precious metals.
On the whole the point is obvious. Yet two factors make the 1963 gap conservative.
First, the index used started Latin America and the rest of the world at the same
level in 1958. Second, the index for the rest of the world includes not just the developed countries, but the underdeveloped countries as well.
27. One writer contends that the tendency of investing nations to withdraw all
profits from their investments during the neo-colonial period was the major cause of the
present low level of economic development, DOBB, op. cit. supra note 14, at 25.
However true that may be, a stronger case exists against the developed nations of the
world today based upon their current trade policies. Those trade policies may well
tend to cause Latin American emphasis on primary good production. For example,
the escaladed tariff structure of the United States makes Latin American production
of commodities for export to the United States less profitable than the production of
primary products for export to the United States. Address by Harry G. Johnston
of the University of Chicago, Theory of Tariff Structure for Economic Development,
at Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee, Oct. 7, 1965. In view of the limited
market for commodities or capital goods in Latin America, this factor is very significant
at the initial level of decision, investment-the level of decision in most Latin American
countries today. Apparently, this rationale is the basis for the recommendation by
the Subcommittee on Inter-American Economic Relationships of the Joint Economic
Committee that the United States reconsider its escaladed tariff structure in light of the
problems facing Latin America. 1962 Report.
28. DOBB, Op. cit. supra note 14, at 17 (lack of technology and management); Gunwald, supra note 20, at 123-24 (lack of capital); KRAUSE, op. cit. supra note 14, at
64-66 (lack of capital); 1962 Report 9 & 14 (lack of technology, managerial knowhow and investment capital).
29. DoBi, op. cit. supra note 14, at 25.
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what little the peasant did develop, was a mere subsistence variety.30
Following the demise of colonialism, agriculture broke down completely. Dissatisfaction with the rural life and the attraction of the
tourist-studded cities, led to mass urbanization.3 ' Despite apparent
need, land reform programs have not succeeded; political unrest32
and social inertia have resisted the breakup of the large estates.
At the same time, backward farming technology and insufficient investment capital have made a new start virtually impossible.3 Thus
today, agricultural production in Latin America remains at a barely
subsistent level; at the same time, dependence upon imported foodstuff is increasing rapidly.34
While the foregoing problems are the heart of the economic troubles
facing most Latin American nations, two other characteristics are
frequently associated with these countries. Actually, these characteristics are only symptomatic of the problems already discussed. Yet
a brief discussion of them will serve to illustrate the complexity
of Latin America's economic ills.
The first of these characteristics is high unemployment. The social
structure of the colonial period created a caste society in which there
was little social fluidity; the labor force was primarily agrarian
peasantry, for the most part unskilled and immoble.3 The rapid
urbanization following the breakdown of the agricultural system
deposited this labor force in underdeveloped industrial centers unable
to employ it.36 Due to the slow rate of industrial expansion and
the inability to reassemble the ruins of the agricultural system, this
rapidly growing mass of unemployed labor represents the most
tragic waste in Latin America today.37
The second symptomatic characteristic of the Latin American
countries is economic instability. The source of this problem originated with colonialism and its concommitant tendency to arrest the
30. Ibid.
31. 1962 Report 17.
32. Political unrest has retarded the implementation of economic development programs generally. Brazil's recent history is a good illustration. During a period of
relative political stability prior to 1964, Brazil experienced the economic growth
which comes with successful economic planning. However, the government's inability to cope with inflation was a significant factor leading to the overthrow of
President Goulart in early 1964. Gilbert, supra note 22, at 9. The new military
regime is finding the economic problems equally disconcerting, see Wall Street Journal,
Dec. 13, 1965, p. 1, col. 1.
33. Williams, Private Investment in World Agriculture, Harv. Bus. Rev., Nov.-Dec.
1965, p. 97.
34. 1962 Report 19-20.
35. KRAusE, op. cit. supra note 14, at 55.
36. 1962 Report 17.
37. Ibid.
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development of economic self-sufficiency. 38 When colonialism ended,
the importance of the world trade position of the new Latin nations
became immediately apparent. What the colonizing countries once
supplied to keep their colonies alive, these small nations now had to
purchase on the competitive world market. For a while their exports of
primary products enabled them to hold their own.39 Yet, as the rest
of the world turned to the manufacture of commodities and capital
goods, the price which Latin American primary exports could command became volatile and began a steady decline.40 When the depression of the 1930's weakened the world markets, those volatile prices
hit bottom throwing many of the Latin American countries into economic collapse. 41 In an effort to recoup their economies, the governments devalued their currency to create necessary investment capital. 42
However, those measures provided only temporary relief and engendered a more serious problem prevailing throughout Latin America
today-inflation.43 The failure to expand industrial and agricultural
production to meet the increasing needs of the swelling urban population has resulted in additional inflationary pressure. 44 Even today
expansion is proceeding at an extremely slow pace; private investment
capital is noticeably lacking and governments hesitate to contribute
to further inflation by increased spending. 45 Meanwhile inflationary
pressures and economic instability continue to plague these countries.
B. The Solution-A Theory for Economic Development
The preceding description of Latin America's economic ills is a
simplification. Even so, the complexity of the problem is apparent.
Necessarily, any solution will be equally complex. Yet at the theoretical level, the basic aspects of a program for the economic development of Latin America are relatively simple and no longer subject
to serious debate. 46 Planners advocate a three-pronged program
38. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
39. DOBB, op. cit. supra note 14, at 23.
40. Ibid.
41. Gunwald, supranote 20, at 123-25.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.; 1962 Report 9-10.
44. Williams, supra note 33, at 96-97.
45. Inflation and the fear of increasing it may be responsible for much of the
inability of these countries to expand. Commenting on the difficulty of using the 2.8
billion dollar of foreign currencies that the United States has accumulated, a recent
article said: "In practice, much of this money is more likely to wind up in the bank.
One reason is that heavy government spending in most underdeveloped nations could
cause inflation. For another, it is seldom used for large-scale development projects,
since these would demand additional investment and operating expenses that few
poor countries can afford." Time Magazine, Feb. 25, 1966, p. 26; Accord, Williams,
supra note 33, at 96-97.
46. DoBB, op. cit. supra note 14, at 36 (citing concensus at the theoretical level).
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aimed at the development of an attractive investment climate, industrial diversification and agrarian reform.
The infrastructure of a country includes its roads, water and power
supplies, communication facilities and generally the conveniences
which are essential for a healthy, attractive investment climate.47 An
adequate infrastructure is a prerequisite to any effective development
program in most Latin American countries. 48 Industrial diversification
and agrarian reform presuppose substantial capital investment-investment that will be forthcoming only when the investment climate
in Latin America has improved.
Economic growth and stability demand an expansion of the limited
industrial potential of the Latin American countries. 49 By diversifying
into the production of capital and consumer goods, these nations can
steady their shaky position in world trade and can eliminate some
of the internal inflationary pressure resulting from the inflexible supply
of industrial produce:Y°
The remainder of the inflationary pressure, that caused by the
inadequate supply of agricultural produce, 51 suggests the third prong
of the program for economic development. Agrarian reform is needed
not only to feed the swelling urban population but also to avoid increased dependence upon importation of foodstuff-a serious threat to
52
the world trade position of the Latin American countries.
A well-planned program aimed at each of these immediate goals
promises some measure of relief for the troubled economies of the3
Latin American countries. Yet more than careful planning is needed.
Each of these immediate goals will require substantial amounts of
capital, technology and managerial knowhow. It is this need that
gives rise to the role of the American corporation in the economic
development of Latin America.
47. Williams, supra note 33, at 96.
48. 1962 Report 29-30.
49. KnRus, op. cit. supra note 14, at 129-42.
50. See notes 40-44 supra and accompanying text. Consider the effect of the recent
mine workers' strike on the economy of Chile which is almost completely dependent
upon the production of copper; the estimated cost of the strike to the Chilean government was over sixty million dollars. See Wall Street Journal, March 24, 1966, p. 21,
col. 1. Another current example has arisen following the sharp rebound in the world
supply of coffee. The repercussions of this swelling supply threaten many of the
fragile Latin American economies dependent on the export of coffee. See Wall Street
Journal, April 18, 1966, p. 18, col. 1-2.
51. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
52. Ibid.
53. Both sides of the socio-political thicket agree that balanced planning is needed.
See DOBB, op. cit. supra note 14, at 36 (a socialistic view); 1962 Report (a capitalistic
view); Gunwald, supra note 20, at 127 (a private businessman's view).
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OF THm AmmCAN
OF LATIN AMEICA

Broadly speaking the context for any conflict between our foreign
policy in Latin America and the extra-territorial application of our
antitrust laws is the role of direct, private American investment in

the economic development of those countries. However, the context
for this examination of that potential conflict is limited to the role of
the American corporation in the economic development of Latin

America. This limitation is justifiable on two grounds. First, existing
corporations are the most likely private American concerns to have
the necessary motivation and capital for direct investment in Latin
America. Second, if non-corporate concerns should decide to invest
in Latin America, the high risks and tax considerations would compel
them to incorporate the venture. 4
54. Risk considerations are probably the primary motivation for the use of the
corporate form. The risks inherent in Latin American investment are discussed notes
61-66 infra and accompanying text.
While tax considerations have never been a major incentive to foreign investment,
see BARn.ow & WEmNa, FoREIGN INVESTMENT AND TAXATION passim (1955),

they

have been a major factor in the choice of form for such investment, Devine, Foreign
Establishment and the Antitrust Law: A Study of the Antitrust Consequences of the
Principle Forms of Investment by American Corporations in Foreign Markets, 57
Nw. U.L. REv. 400 (1960). The tax advantages of the corporate form vary depending
whether the foreign operation is incorporated in the United States or in the foreign
country.

If the foreign operation is to be organized in the foreign country, several tax considerations compel the use of the corporate form. Generally in the case of noncorporate business organizations, income is taxed to the investors in the year in which
it is earned. See, e.g., INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954 §§ 701, 703 (partnerships). The same
is true where the non-corporate business is organized and conducted in a foreign
country; the income is taxed currently to the American investors. In contrast, corporate
income is taxed to American stockholders only when the corporate earnings and profits
are distributed to them. Until the passage of the Revenue Act of 1962, this rule
applied to earnings and profits of foreign corporations, Dowdle, Can Domestic Shareholders Be Taxed on Foreign Corporate Earnings Prior to Distribution?,40 TAxEs 436
(1962). This fact and the immunity of foreign corporations from the United States
income tax presented an opportunity for accumulating earnings and profits without incurring the income tax. American investors took advantage of this opportunity. Not until
they attempted to sell the stock of the foreign corporation and bring those accumulated
earnings home as long term capital gain, did Congress react. In the Revenue Act of
1962, Congress qualified this advantage of the foreign corporation in two respects. First,
all income of "controlled foreign corporations," defined in section 957(a), other than
that derived from the operation of a trade or business in the foreign country, is
taxed currently to domestic stockholders holding more than ten per cent of the combined voting power. her. Rnv. CoDE OF 1954 §§ 951(a)(1), 952(2), 953 & 954.
The effect of this provision on the advantage of the foreign corporation vis-a-vis noncorporate foreign business organizations is limited since the act still permits the
tax-free accumulation of the foreign corporation's operating income. The second
qualification is more significant. Upon the sale of "controlled foreign corporation"
stock by a shareholder holding ten per cent of the combined voting power, the total
gain is subject to taxation as ordinary income to the stockholder. INT. REv. CODE OF
1954 § 1243. See also Johnson, Beware of Ordinary Income When Selling Foreign

NOTES

A. The Role of the American Corporation-Its Potentials
and Proper Sphere of Investment Competence
The role of the American corporation in Latin America's economic
growth arises out its potentials as a means for utilizing the vast
reservoir of private American capital, technology and managerial
talent to assist in the economic development of those backward
countries. Not only are the potentials obvious, but the need to utilize
these potentials is beyond dispute.
The need for private American investment in Latin America's
economic recovery results from the interaction of three factors. First,
the task is enormous and complex. Second, the individual Latin
American countries cannot accomplish this enormous endeavor without
foreign assistance. 55 Finally, the public sector of the United States,
Stock; Final Regs Show Impact of 1248, J.TAxA-no, March 1966, p. 180. While
this provision does remove the foreign corporation from the tax "haven," it does not
eliminate the tax advantages of the corporate form in foreign operations; the law still
permits the tax-free accumulation of operating income-a substantial advantage for
the young growing operation. Moreover, when the foreign corporation is to operate
in Latin America, the impact of the 1962 Act is less severe. Neither provision of the
act applies to the earnings and profits of "less developed country corporations," which
are defined in section 902(d) to include controlled foreign corporations in most Latin
American countries, if the shareholders or shareholder concerned holds his stock in
such a corporation for ten years. The ten year restriction does not apply to the
exclusion from taxation on current income, only to the exclusion from section 1248,
supra. As applied to section 1248, the ten year restriction has met heavy criticism on
the ground that in view of the risk of investment in underdeveloped countries a ten
year commitment is too great. See Popkin, Less Developed Countries and the Revenue
Act of 1962, 40 IND. LJ. 1, 3 (1964).
If a foreign operation is organized in the United States, the corporate form has more
tax advantages. Of course earnings and profits may still be accumulated without being
taxed to the stockholders. Some qualification is needed here, because the accumulation is not tax-free. The earnings and profits of the domestic corporation are taxed to
the corporation currently, though at rates generally lower than those applied to individuals. Moreover, accumulation is limited by the accumulated earnings tax sections,
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 §§ 531-37. In addition to the advantages of the corporation
as a devise for accumulating earnings, The Western Hemisphere Trade Corporation
Act makes the corporate form more advantageous where the business is to operate in
Central and South America. Such domestic corporations receive a special deduction
from taxable income if they come within the provisions of that act. See INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954 §§ 921-22. This deduction is available only to domestic corporations. Ibid.
55. The need for foreign capital and other assistance is an issue upon which the
socialistic and capitalistic economic theorists have disagreed. The socialists argue
that the underdeveloped countries could pull themselves up by their own economic
bootstraps, see, e.g., DOBB, op. cit. supra note 14, at 38-39. Reduced to simple terms
the argument for self-sufficiency is that by programing a high rate of investment relative to currently employed capital, the rate of economic growth may be increased to
a level which over a period of years would permit the underdeveloped countries to
catch up with the rest of the world. The economic derivation of this theory is as
follows:
(1) growth rate=investment ratio
aggregate output ratio
(2) aggregate output ratio=presently employed capital
total current output
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the leader in free world assistance to Latin America, simply cannot
provide all the foreign aid needed.56
(3) investment ratio=current investment
current total income
(4) total current income=total current output
(5) growth rate=current investment
X
total current income
presently employed capital
total current output
=current investment
presently employed capital
Since the amount of presently employed capital is extremely low, relative to current
income, the socialists conclude that by reinvesting most of the current income the rate of
growth will be high.
The weakness of the argument for self-sufficiency as applied to the Latin American
countries is generally accepted by those governments today. While current income
is high relative to currently employed capital, it is not sufficient to initiate that grand
spiral upward. Williams, supra note 33, at 96: "[T]he reality facing developing nations, no matter what its political predilection, is that there is just not enough money
in the public till to satisfy its demands for infrastructure development. This being the
case, what chance is there for ample public investment in production?" Moreover,
economic growth requires more than a mere increase in the proportion of national
income which goes into productive investment. Technological progress (education
and research), employment efficiency and many other intermediate goals must be
attained. KmscrFmr, op. cit. supra note 12, at 11-12. The argument for self-sufficiency
assumes that there is time: time to develop technology, time to train unskilled labor
and time to amass the capital needed for the initial productive investments. Yet time
is something these underdeveloped countries do not have. Many of their potentials
may be of limited duration. For example, the development of oil resources could
provide the impetus for economic growth in many of the Latin American countries,
MoussA, op. cit. supra note 9, at 172. The United States may need as much as three
hundred thousand barrels per day in 1966-an enormous opportunity for these countries.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1966, p. 78, cols. 3-8. Yet twenty years from now the need for
oil may disappear. The need for economic development is urgent. BrLcK, Tim
DipLomrcy oF ECONOMiC DEvEL oMENT 3 (1960); Butler & Dearden, Managing a
Worldwide Business, Harv. Bus. Rev., May-June 1965, p. 93.
56. Economically these efforts are limited by several factors. First, is the limited
utility of such investment as a stimulus to the economy of the United States. Some
economists have argued that assistance to underdeveloped countries can be justified
solely on the basis of the economic stimulus of such contributions on the economy of
the contributor, MoussA, op. cit. supra note 9, at 173-75. The argument is that the
investment in the underdeveloped countries will stimulate growth which in turn will
result in orders to the contributing country for machines and other materials needed
in that growth process. However, practice has shown the fallacy of that argument,
KIRscHEN, op. cit. supra note 12, pp. 30-31, 48-49 & 59. The fallacy results from
what has been termed "leakage"-the economic stimulus from the newly engendered
orders may not be directed at the contributing country, but may leak out as the orders
are made with other countries where the price may be better.
The second economic factor limiting the efforts of the public sector of the United
States is the limited utility of foreign aid as a stimulus to the economic development
of the Latin American countries. Apparently this has been the result of ineffective
management and planning behind such financial assistance, Clee & Lindsay, New
Patterns for Overseas Operations, Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.-Feb. 1961, pp. 67-68.
Finally, even if such assistance were of greater economic utility, there are limits on
the ability of the United States government to help. Assisting in the economic development of Latin America is only one of the many objectives of the United States
government. Competing with that objective are the war on poverty, the war in
Vietnam, and the attempt to balance the unfavorable imbalance of payments, to name
just a few. Morever, if the United States should ear-mark funds for Latin America,
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Some understanding of the proper role of direct private investment
in Latin America is a prerequisite to a full appreciation of the potential contribution of the American corporation. A consensus now
exists that the spheres of competence for private and public investment in economic development programs ought to correspond to the
almost natural dichotomy between the two basic types of investment
needed. On the one hand, there is a need for investment in the
infrastructure.5 7 On the other is the need for investment in productive
facilities-in farms, factories and distribution systems.5 8 Generally,

private investment should be limited to the development of productive
facilities; only when infrastructure improvements are essential to a
productive investment should private capital be used to make them.5 9
Within its sphere of competence, the theoretical potentials of

the American corporation are unlimited. 60 Utilizing American inthey may be used for projects with priority over productive investment, such as the
food for peace program. See, e.g., Wall Street Journal, Jan. 13, 1966, p. 6, col. 2.
57. See notes 47 & 48 supra and accompanying text.
58. See notes 49-52 supra and accompanying text.
59. Williams, supra note 33, at 96; 1962 Report 25-26. Of course, some investment
in infrastructure improvements may be necessary in order to begin productive investments. For example, a mining venture may require the construction of a railroad link
to the site of the mine. However, where such investments have not been reasonably
necessary for productive investment they have aroused the ire of Latin American
governments. See MoussA, op. cit. supra note 9, at 187.

60. Many of the limitations upon the efforts of the public sector of the United States'
economy do not limit the efforts of private American businessmen, compare discussion
in note 56 supra. In the first place, private investment has proven to have greater
utility. For the most part it has been profitable for the economies of the Latin
American countries and for the United States investors, Gunwald, supra note 20, at 128.
Moreover, private investment in Latin America has been a greater stimulus to the
American economy than has United States government assistance to those countries.
Apparently there is less leakage, compare note 56 supra. In addition, part of the
profits accruing from those investments return to the United States in the form of
dividends. For example, consider the following table comparing the income receipts
with the direct investment flows of United States dollars into and out of Latin America
for the past ten years:
Year
1950
1955
1960
1963
1964
Receipts
522.0
678.0
641.0
801.0
909.0
Payments
1.0
.5(-)
-0.5(-)
.5(-)
In explanation, the figures represent millions of dollars. U.S. BUREAu OF CENsus, 1966
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNnTD STATES 856 (table 1224).
In the second place, private investment is not limited by the various competing
public objectives limiting government assistance. Consider, for example, the impact
of the balance of payments problem on direct private investment in Latin America.
Putting to one side the merits of the present program of voluntary restraints [see, e.g.,
Wall Street Journal, Dec. 22, 1965, (general editorial criticism); Wall Street Journal,
Dec. 24, 1965, p. 3, col. 3 (need for a long-range view); Dean, statement before the
Congressional hearings, Hart Committee Hearings 82-83 (over the long haul direct
foreign investment and the returns thereon have been a net plus factor in payments
posture); NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, U.S. PRODUCTION ABROAD AND THE
BALANCE OF PAY~miTs passim (1966) (substantial reduction in current investment
abroad is likely to produce a long range decline in earnings from abroad)] under
which American business is being asked to curb their foreign investments according to
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vestment capital, technology and managerial expertise the American
corporation can play a vital part in the economic development of Latin
America by doing what it already does well-combining factors of
production into efficient, profitable and, in the case of Latin America,
vital industrial operations.
B. The Investment Problems and the Possible Solutionsthe Methods of Direct PrivateInvestment and
Their Ancillary Arrangements
Merely pointing out that the American corporation could and must
make a valuable contribution to the industrial development of Latin
America does not make that contribution possible. Foreign investment
in any form faces a multitude of problems, and direct investment in
Latin America is no exception.
Even though accumulation of capital through the corporate device
insulates stockholders from the full effect of financial disaster, most
corporations are unwilling to commit an unlimited amount of investment capital to Latin America enterprises. Any direct investment in
Latin America is more risky than a similar investment in economically
stable nations. In addition to the vagaries of the Latin American
economies, political uncertainty adds many hazards: expropriation,
politically motivated labor problems and the annoyance of inexpert
and erratic governmental regulations resulting from periodic political
upheavals are timely examples.6 ' In addition, the virtual requirement
a formula based upon net outflow of dollars in the immediately preceeding year, see
Wall Street Journal, Dec. 6, 1965, p. 2, col. 1. This program does not promise to
have a negative impact on private investment in Latin America. Apparently, the
administration has determined that the public interest in the development of the
economically backward countries of the world overrides the objectives of the voluntary
restraints program; that program does not apply to investments in Latin America, see
Id. at p. 2, cols. 1-2. In total effect, the present program may encourage private investment in Latin America.
61. In addition to the risks caused by the undesirable investment climate and the
shaky economies of these countries, see notes 43-45 & 48 supra and accompanying
text, political instability adds many hazards.
The danger of expropriation is constantly present. At least one writer believes that
the absence of guarantees against expropriation was partly responsible for the drop
in movement of private capital to underdeveloped countries in 1960, MoussA, Timl
UNDERPI-VILEGED NATIONS 125-26. But see FrI Dm!ANN & Pucu, LEcAL AsPECrs o
FoRIGN INV smmmmS 732-33: "[Ilt is the continuing community of interests between
foreign investors and the capital-receiving state, which . . . [provides] the real basis
for the investor's security." The International Cooperative Administration has attempted
to insure private investment against wars and expropriation, Devine, supra note 54, at
405 n.23.
Politically motivated labor problems are frequent. Kennecott Copper Corporation
and Anaconda Company, Chile's leading copper producers, have experienced recent
politically motivated mine worker strikes costing the companies millions of dollars.
For history, see Wall Street Journal, Dec. 18, 1965, p. 3, cols. 4-6; Wall Street Journal,
March 22, 1966, p. 3, col. 2; Wall Street Journal, March 29, 1966, p. 21, col. 1. See
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that business operations in Latin American countries have local equity
and management interests has caused many American corporations
to hesitate. 2 Local participation does present an opportunity for
sharing risks with local capital. It may even tend to reduce risks by
eliminating the natural friction that exists between a foreign dominated business and the community in which it is conducted. Yet local
participation creates a possibility that the facility may be used to
compete with the American corporation for United States markets.
Investments in facilities for the manufacture of capital or consumer
goods are particularly subject to this consideration. The desirability
from an economic standpoint of exporting such products3 would be
ample motivation for local government action encouraging their
export. Moreover, the limited Latin American market for these
products,6 the proximity of the United States market 65 and the distinct
also Wall Street Journal, March 22, 1966, p. 3, col. 2 (politically motivated labor
problems in Dominican Republic caused the South Puerto Rico Sugar Company losses of
almost 900,000 dollars in 1965).
Finally, political instability with a concomitant turnover of government personnel
often brings inexpert and erratic government regulation of local industry, see note 33
supra.

62. The requirements are seldom complete, but operate only to insure that effective
control of the enterprise will remain in the hands of nationals. These restrictions usually
take the form of limitations on the percentage of capital which may be owned by
foreign interests and the percentage of directors which may be foreigners. FmaMnNN
& PUGH, op. cit. supranote 61, at 743-47.

In view of the unfortunate experience most of the Latin American countries had with
earlier foreign investment, see notes 17-19 supra and accompanying text, the existence
of these regulations is easy to understand. In the first place they tend to keep a
portion of the investment returns in the underdeveloped country for reinvestment. In
the second place they give those with a genuine interest in the economic growth of
the country a voice-and often a majority voice-in the management.
Even in those countries where no such regulations exist, the natural friction between
an alien business and the local community has lead many American corporations to seek
foreign participation. Devine, supra note 54, at 439. See also, Friedmann, Antitrust
Law and Joint International Business Ventures in Economically Underdeveloped
Countries, 60 CoLum. L. Rv. 780, 784 (1960) (friction often takes the form of
national economic or administrative policies operating in favor of firms with local
capital or management participation).
63. See notes 40 & 50 supra and accompanying text. Export of heavy-consumer
and capital goods would tend to stabilize the shaky international trade position of
the Latin American countries.
64. While the production of heavy-consumer and capital goods is one of the vital
economic needs of the Latin American countries, the prevailing low standard of living
and the slow pace of industrial expansion make Latin America a very limited market
for these products. Of course, Latin America is a promising market for light-consumer
and agricultural produce, see Williams, supra note 33 (agricultural produce); Time
Magazine, March 4, 1966, p. 98, cols. 2-3 (light-consumer goods).
65. The proximity of the American markets is obvious. That fact probably explains
why the United States has been the major market for Latin American exports, see note
9 supra and authorities cited therein. The extremely protectionistic policies of the common market countries with respect to heavy-consumer and capital goods production,
see Rome Treaty, 298 U.N.T.S. 14, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 2 & annex 1, and the likelihood
that the United States will adopt less protective policies in the future, see note 27
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possibility that the Latin American venture might compete for the
United States market at an advantage over American producers"0
are all strong incentives for such action on the part of the local participants.
These investment problems might limit the actual role of the
American corporation in Latin America, if businessmen were unable

to devise effective methods of dealing with them.
However, American business acumen has not found these obstacles
67
insurmountable. New methods of risk evaluation are evolving.
Joint ventures between American corporations and between American
corporations and Latin American interests are being used to minimize
the risks and meet local participation requirements. 8 Where foreign
participation is used, businessmen have suggested the use of pricefixing and market division arrangements to reduce the impact of
competition from the foreign operation. 69 Unless these business solusupra, indicate that the United States may well remain the major market for Latin
American exports when those countries begin to export heavy-consumer and capital
goods in the future.
66. Several conditions discussed in Part II make it likely that Latin American
joint ventures could compete for United States markets at an advantage over American
producers. First, unemployment is high. Naturally the labor expense for operations
in these countries is low-extremely low relative to that in the United States. Second,
intelligent business planning on the part of American investors on the one hand and
broad economic planning on the part of Latin American governments on the other are
bound to result in the location of productive facilities close to the component factors of
production. Finally, when these low cost factors of production are combined in processes developed and managed by American technological and managerial talent, the
likely result is a product with a cost basis substanially lower than that of similar
products manufactured in the United States. Even if the United States' present escaladed
tariff structure and freight costs do impose an additional cost factor on the Latin
American products, these products could conceivably reach the United States market
with a cost basis comparing favorably with that of similar domestic products. In the
long run, should the United States revise its tariff policies, the competitive advantage
may be increased. For an expansion on the last point, see note 27 supra.
67. See, e.g., Butler & Dearden, supra note 55, at 93 (political and economic risk
analysis); Clee & Lindsay, supra note 56, at 67 (management problems in international
operations); Hertz, Risk Analysis in Capital Investment, Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.-Feb.
1964, p. 961.
68. Devine, supra note 54, at 439; Friedmann, supra note 62, at 781.
69. There are two possible approaches to this dilemma. On the one hand, the
United States investor may simply decide against the investment, see Persen, written
statement, Hart Committee Hearings 52-54. This approach is not desirable from the
standpoint of United States foreign policy encouraging such investment. On the other
hand, the United States private investor may go ahead with the investment, taking steps
to reduce the potential competitive threat. For example, he might enter a pricefixing agreement under which the newly formed joint venture would agree not to sell
its products in the United States for less than the prevailing price for simliar domestic
products at the time of the sale. Another possible solution would be an agreement
dividing market territories in the United States thereby assuring the United States
investor his own domestic market and at the same time providing a market for the
newly formed joint venture. Neither arrangement necessarily involves anticompetitive
motives in the traditional sense. In fact both agreements would be temporary-until a
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tions run afoul of United States antitrust laws, there is every reason
for cautious optimism about the American corporation's role in the
industrial development of Latin America.
IV. TE POTENTIAL FOR CoNrFLIcIr-TiE EXTIA-TERB1TOmIAL
APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAWS

At one time the possibility that the proposed Latin American joint
venture or the ancillary price-fixing or market division agreements
might run afoul of United States antitrust laws would never have
occurred to students of international law. Conduct beyond the territorial boundaries of a country was thought to be outside its legislative jurisdiction. Today, however, the possible applicability of
United States antitrust laws to conduct beyond the territorial confines
of the United States is widely recognized. This possibility gives rise
to the potential for conflict between those laws and United States
foreign policy encouraging direct private investment in Latin America.
The following discussion will attempt to illustrate how our antitrust laws have been applied to extra-territorial conduct in the past
and how several jurisdictional problems may limit that application
in the future.
A. The United States Antitrust Laws Applied
Extra-Territorially-inGeneral
Most of the principles of United States antitrust law have been
developed by our courts in cases arising in a purely interstate context. In the foreign commerce arena many factors come into play
which are not present in interstate commerce.70 Timken Roller Bearing Company v. United States"1 was the first case squarely meeting
the argument that some modification of existing antitrust principles is
justified by the vicissitudes of foreign trade.72 To the defendants' conLatin American market for the product involved develops, compare note 64 supra
and accompanying text.
70. Brewster, The Influence of International Factors, PERsPEC
POLICY 335 (Phillips ed. 1965).

IvES
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UST

71. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
72. Actually, United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947
(D. Mass. 1950), dealt with this issue first. However, the significance of that dis-

cussion is questionable in view of the court's conclusion that the vicissitudes of
foreign commerce were not the actual motivation behind the questioned agreements.
The court found that the defendants had acted out of a desire to improve the profit
margin on their sales in certain European markets. In view of those conclusions, the

often quoted passage from the opinion is clearly dicta: "It may very well be that
even though there is an economic or political barrier which entirely precludes American
exports to a foreign country, a combination of dominant American manufacturers to
establish joint factories for the sole purpose of serving the internal commerce of that
country is a per se violation of . . . the Sherman Act." Id. at 967.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 19

tention that they were justified by international trade conditions 3
in entering a European cartel, the Supreme Court of the United States

answered:
This position ignores the fact that the provisions in the Sherman Act
against restraints of foreign trade are based on the assumption, and reflect
the policy, that export and import trade in commodities is both possible
and desirable. Those provisions . . . are wholly inconsistent with . . .
the defendants' argument ....

Acceptance of . ..

that view would make

the Sherman Act a dead letter insofar as it prohibits contracts and conspiracies in restraint of foreign trade. If such a drastic change is to be
made in the statute, Congress is the one to do it.74

That rationale was properly criticised by Justice Frankfurter's strong

dissent. 75 Yet with only one qualification, to be discussed momen-

tarily, the courts have continued to apply to foreign commerce without alteration antitrust principles tailored to fit interstate commerce.70
One general observation about the case following the Timken
approach will suggest a qualification. Practically all have involved

commerce between the United States and the other developed nations
of the world.7

Commercial competition is quite apposite to corn-

In Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, supra note 71, on the other hand,
the United States Supreme Court met the issue squarely. While the district court
had found that the dominant purpose in this case was equally anticompetitive, the
appellants challenged that finding. The Supreme Court proceeded as though there
had been no such finding: "Regardless of this, however, appellant's argument must
be rejected." Id. at 598.
73. "The argument in this regard seems to be that tariffs, quota restrictions and the
like are now such that the export and import of antifriction bearings can no longer be
expected as a practical matter; that appellant cannot successfully sell its Americanmade goods abroad; and that the only way it can profit from business in England,
France and other countries is through the ownership of stock in companies organized
and manufacturing there." Id. at 599.
74. Ibid.
75. "Of course, it is not for this court to formulate economic policy as to foreign
commerce. But the conditions controlling foreign commerce may be relevant . . . (to
this court's application of the policies set by Congress in the Sherman Act)" 341 U.S.
at 605. Certainly, in light of the well established notion that Congress, by enacting
the Sherman Act, has placed upon the courts the responsibility for determining what
restraints of commerce are unreasonable, the rationale of the Supreme Court in
Timken is unacceptable. The defendants were not arguing for a judicial rejection of
Congressional policy. Their plea was merely one for a reasonable application of that
policy.
76. BREwsTau, AN=rrfUsT AND AMNmIcAN Busiess ABROAD 362 (business justification
defense); FuGATE, FOREIGN COMMERcE AND THE ANTITRUST LAws 101 (price fixing),
110, 113 & 114 (market sharing arrangements), 121 (refusals to deal), 135 (the per
se rule and the rule of reason).
77. Friedmann, supra note 62, at 785. Aside from American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909), discussed note 107 infra and accompanying text, this
writer is aware of only five exceptions to this statement. Two of those, United States
v. United Fruit Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1958 Trade Cas.) f[ 68,941 (E. D. La. 1958),
and Sanib Corp. v. United Fruit Co., 135 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), turned upon
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with whom our
merce between the United States and those nations
8
foreign policy is one of cooperative competition.
The major criticism of the commentators is directed at the possibility that the same approach might be taken toward foreign commerce between the United States and the underdeveloped countries
of the world.?9 Based upon the present case-law, this criticism may
be premature. Thus far, the only cases applying the antitrust laws
to United States commerce with underdeveloped nations have taken a
more liberal approach.80 The rationale behind this treatment is not
entirely clear. Some of the cases seem to be applying international
law principles of legislative jurisdiction 8 ' to find United States antitrust laws inapplicable. Others seem to contradict the rationale of
the Timken case by holding that the peculiar difficulties of investment
in underdeveloped countries justify a modification of antitrust
principles. 3 Whichever rationale is used, the inherent logic of
international law principles of legislative jurisdiction, see note 106 infra and accompanying text, rather than United States antitrust policy. The remaining three are United
States v. American Cyanamid Co., TRADE REG. REP. (1964 Trade Cas.) f[ 71,166
(S.D.N.Y. 1964) (consent decree); United States v. Pan American World Airways,
193 F. Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 371 U.S. 296 (1963); and
United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
78. Brewster, supra note 70, 357.
79. Ibid.; Friedmann, supranote 62, 785.
80. See note 77 supra and cases cited therein.
81. See note 106 infra and accompanying text.
82. The consent decrees in United States v. American Cynamid Co., supra note
77, and in United States v. United Fruit Co., supra note 77, applied only to conduct
having an effect on United States imports or interstate commerce. Compare notes 11827 infra and accompanying text. Likewise, Sanib Corp. v. United Fruit Co., supra
note 77, was primarily concerned with the legislative jurisdiction of the United States,
Id. at 766.
83. United States v. Pan American World Airways, supra note 77, indicated that
a joint venture between two air-line companies for the purpose of establishing an airfreight route to the southern coast of South America would be perfectly legal. Rather
than dismiss the case for lack of legislative jurisdiction, see note 106 infra and accompanying text, the court assumed that the application of our antitrust laws was
appropriate. Under existing case-law a joint venture between substantial competitors
like those before the court might have been unreasonable per se, see note 135 infra
and accompanying text. Yet the court held that the high risks and the unlikelihood
that either company would have made the investment alone made this joint venture
reasonable, Id. at 32-36. The court did go on to hold that when the defendant, Pan
American, used its ownership interest to thwart the venture's effort to extend its line
to a United States terminal, it did run afoul of the Sherman Act, Ibid. One could
rationalize the case in terms of legislative jurisdiction; however, that was not the
rationale of the court. Accord, 3 B.C. IND. & CoM. L.R. 107, 111-12 (1961). Nevertheless, the possibility of such a rationalization and the subsequent reversal on the
ground that the Civil Aeronautics Board had exclusive original jurisdiction may weaken
the value of this case as precedent. However, in United States v. Imperial Chemical
Industries, Ltd., supra note 77, the United States clearly had legislative jurisdiction;
the Brazilian joint venture had been organized and used as part of a plan for
dividing world markets-including the United States markets. Id. at 238-39. Yet the
court did not order divestiture until it had considered the value of the joint venture
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modifying antitrust policies as applied to foreign trade between the

United States and those countries with whom our foreign policy is not
based upon absolute competitive assumptions may point the way for

future cases. However, one factor which may tend to divert the
courts from that rational course and give substance to the anticipa-

tion of commentators is the position of the Justice Department.
The position of the Justice Department is more unyielding than
that of the courts. The federal antitrust laws expressly include foreign
commerce within their scope, and the Antitrust Division of the

Justice Department apparently feels duty-bound to enforce those laws

as written.85 The Division has specifically rejected the suggestion
that it use its discretion as a prosecutor to act in the capacity of a
regulatory agency mitigating the harshness of a strict application of
existing antitrust principles to foreign commerce. 86 A liaison does
exist between the Foreign Commerce Section of the Antitrust Division
and the Division of Restrictive Business Practices of the Department

of State.8 7 However, any modifications of Justice Department en-

forcement policy resulting from consultations through that medium
are based solely upon grounds of international politics and not upon
the basis of economic or business considerations.P
The Justice Department's approach toward the application of the
antitrust laws to foreign conduct is the result of several factors, of
which the least important is the oath of office usually cited as parain the industrial development of Brazil. The court concluded: "While it is true that
the joint companies have made substantial contributions to the industrialization of the
countries in which they were formed, we find that greater progress in that direction
might have been made . . . (if that noble ambition, rather than the desire to divide
world markets, had been paramount)." Id. at 239.
84. Actually, the Sherman Act is the only federal antitrust law expressly including
"foreign" commerce within its scope. The Clayton Act uses the term "commerce"
without specifying whether that term includes foreign as well as domestic commerce.
The Justice Department believes that by using the term "commerce" without the
adjective "domestic," Congress was expressly including foreign commerce within the
reach of the Clayton Act. See notes 98-105 infra and accompanying text.
85. Address by William H. Orrick, Jr., the former Assistant Atorney General in
charge of the Antitrust Division, before the Quarterly Meeting of the United States
Inter-American Council, Inc., in New York City, New York, Dec. 7, 1964.
86. "Gentleman, I say to you that such a role is completely incompatible with my
oath of office." Ibid.
87. The liaison referred to is interesting. However, due to its informal operation,
a precise definition of its nature is impossible. Broadly speaking any pending action by
the Justice Department likely to have political repercussions with foreign governments
is referred to the Division of Restrictive Business Practices. When such a referral
is made, the Division of Restrictive Business Practices concerns itself with only one
issue: Are there any political reasons why the pending action should not be brought?
If the answer to that question is in the negative, the consultation ends at that point.
Questions of economic policy and antitrust law are left entirely to the Justice Department. Interview with David B. Ortman, Division of Restrictive Business Practices of
the United States Department of State, in Washington, D.C., Dec. 29, 1965.
88. See note 87 supra.
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First, the Antitrust Division, with its present, limited

facilities, could not possibly take a regulatory approach to foreign
commerce. An attempt to do so would not only foreclose it from
executing its responsibilities regarding interstate commerce, but would
also overwhelm its present personnel completely. 90 Second, the Justice
Department is simply not convinced that the application of the antitrust laws to foreign conduct results in any real hardship to American
businesses operating in foreign countries. 91 Until this attitude is
changed the Justice Department is unlikely to alter its current enforcement policy.92
In view of the position of the courts and the Justice Department,
one might reasonably conclude the extra-territorial application of
United States antitrust laws is not substantially different from the
application of those laws to conduct entirely within the United States.
Yet such a conclusion would be erroneous. Several jurisdictional
problems have tended to modify, to some extent, the application of
our antitrust principles to foreign conduct.
93

B. JurisdictionalObstacles to Extra-TerritorialApplication
In order to simplify, the following discussion will be limited to those
problems that arise where an American corporation located within the
territorial confines of the United States operates a joint venture incorporated under the laws of a foreign country or enters agreements
with that joint venture in the foreign country. The jurisdictional
problems are of two types. The first involves the judicial jurisdiction
89. See note 86 supra.
90. Interview with Wilbur L. Fugate, Chief of the Foreign Commerce Section of
the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, in Washington, D.C., Dec. 29, 1965.
Accord, Orrick, supra note 85.
91. "[W]e are most anxious to learn of instances in which the antitrust laws deter
export transactions. I must tell you that to date not one, I repeat, not one such instance
has been brought to my attention from any source whatever. I must marvel over the
persistency of this myth." Ibid. The Justice Department has traditionally inferred
that the foreign commerce aspects of the antitrust laws work no hardship from the
absence of any showing of specific instances where the antitrust laws have deterred
worthwhile business endeavors. However, it has been argued that the absence of such
showings are a result of the business communities' unwillingness to bring the intimate
details of their dealings under the gaze of the Justice Department. Interview with
Mark S. Massel, at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., Dec. 29, 1965.
92. William Persen, Vice President and editor of Business International, attempted
to change the Justice Department's attitude by listing twenty specific instances where
antitrust considerations had deterred worthwhile business endeavors at the recent
Congressional hearings. Hart Committee Hearings 52-54. To date this is the only
response to Mr. Orrick's plea, see note 91 supra. To what extent statements like that
of Mr. Persen may change the Justice Department's enforcement policies is diffiicult to
predict. This difficulty is compounded by the very recent appointment of Donald F.
Turner to head the Antitrust Division.
93. Brewster apparently coined the expression "jurisdictional obstacles," Brewster,
supranote 70, at 364.
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of the United States courts. Can they effectively control the conduct
of the foreign joint venture? The second problem concerns the jurisdiction of the United States courts over the subject matter of the
alleged antitrust violations. Can the United States antitrust laws be
applied to the extra-territorial conduct of the foreign joint venture?
1. Judicial Jurisdiction.-Clearly,in the limited situation proposed,
finding effective judicial jurisdiction presents no problem. Assuming
arguendo that the United States courts would not have in personam
jurisdiction either over the joint venture incorporated under the laws
of a Latin American country or over a national or government of that
country, 94 they would have jurisdiction over the American corporation
investing in Latin America. 95 This would enable United States courts
corporation
to dissolve the joint venture or to enjoin the American
96
from carrying out the extra-territorial agreements.
94. Of course the United States courts could not exercise judicial jurisdiction over
the governments of any Latin American country; sovereign immunity would prevent
that. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., supra note 77. Likewise doubtful is
the judicial jurisdiction of United States courts over the Latin American nationals
investing in the joint venture.
There are three possible bases for granting the United States courts judicial jurisdiction over the joint venture incorporated in Latin America. Section twelve of the
Clayton Act provides three grounds for judicial jurisdiction over corporations under
the antitrust laws: (1) if the corporation is an "inhabitant" of the jurisdiction in
which the suit is brought; (2) if the corporation is "found" within the jurisdiction in
which the suit is brought; and (3) if the corporation "transacts business" within the
jurisdiction in which the suit is brought. See 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 22
(1958). A Latin American venture with an import agent in the United States may
be held to be an inhabitant, see Goldlaur, Inc. v. Shubert, 169 F. Supp. 677 (E.D.
Pa. 1958). See also Courtesy Chevrolet, Inc. v. Tennessee Walking Horse Breeders'
and Exhibitors' Assoc., 344 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1965). United States v. Watchmakers
of Switzerland Information Center, 133 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), went farther
than any other case to date to hold a foreign corporation "found" within the United
States. In that case the foreign subsidiaries of United States corporations were found
within the United States because the corporate parents had acted as agents for the
foreign subsidiaries in the United States. Due to the diplomatic frenzy following that
decision, future holdings going that far are unlikely. Moreover, that case involved
a wholly owned foreign subsidiary. In the typical situation dealt with in this paper
the foreign venture may have a foreign national stockholder interest. In fact, majority
control in the board of directors is possible. On this point consider some interesting
dicta in the Swiss Watch case: "Here there is a further distinction, jurisdiction over the
parent is not being sought through a subsidiary but jurisdiction over the subsidiary is
being sought through the parent. We are free of the danger that a corporation may
be drawn into litigation in a strange forum by the acts of someone relatively unfamiliar
with its major policies and unimportant in its corporate hierarchy. Here, the court
already has jurisdiction over the policy making body which gave its deliberate assent
to the alleged unlawful enterprises." Id. at 48. Extension of jurisdiction over the supposed Latin American joint venture would run squarely into the "danger" which the
court in the Swiss Watch case believed it had avoided. It is unlikely that our Latin
American joint venture would be held to "transact business" in the United States. See
United States v. Scophony Corp., 333 U.S. 795 (1948); Snyder v. Eastern Auto Distributors, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (1966 Trade Cas.) ff 71,703 (4th Cir. 1966).
95. See discussion in note 94 supra.
96. Of course the absence of the foreign associates would have a limiting effect
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2. Jurisdiction Over the Subject Matter.-Whether United States
courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter of antitrust violations
arising out of conduct beyond the territorial boundaries of the United
States is a double-barrelled question. The first aspect of this question
is a problem of competence, i.e., did Congress intend that the courts
would apply the antitrust laws to the particular extra-territorial conduct in question. The second aspect involves a problem of legislative
jurisdiction, i.e., could Congress have intended to reach this particular
extra-territorial conduct consistent with principles of international
law. Both aspects of this double-barrelled question are interrelated.
If the courts find that Congress does not have legislative jurisdiction
over particular conduct as a matter of international law, they would
probably hold that Congress did not intend to reach that conduct. 97
Yet for purposes of discussion it is helpful to treat the two issues
separately.
The starting point for either inquiry is article I, section eight of the
United States Constitution providing that Congress "shall have power
...

to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations ...

."

The question

of competence is one of statutory construction; to what extent has
Congress exercised that power? Once Congress has exercised that
power, the question of legislative jurisdiction is the extent to which
international law would permit that exercise.
a. Competence.-The Sherman Act, the first trade regulation statute
passed by Congress, is a broadly phrased policy statement evidencing
an intention that the courts should develop United States antitrust
principles. 9 Yet the Sherman Act is specific in declaring illegal restraints of trade or commerce "among the several States, or with
foreign nations ... ."99 Taking this expression literally, the courts have
applied the Sherman Act to extra-territorial conduct affecting the
foreign commerce of the United States regardless of whether or not
interstate commerce is involved. 100 In addition, the courts have held
upon the scope of the court's decree, see United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F.
Supp. 513, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd per curiam, 332 U.S. 319 (1947). Yet
practically speaking, the effectiveness of the decree will not be diminished. See, e.g.,
United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., supra note 77, at 238; Skiold,
Antitrust Problems in InternationalTrade, 10 ANTIrrUsT BuLL. 442, 445 (1965).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
98. "[Ilt was purposely drawn in general terms for the courts to interpret, the
intention being that no business legitimately carried on need fear interference." FAu.ULNEm, AmmucAN EcONOMIC HIsToRy 438 (8th ed. 1958).
99. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958), (Emphasis added.) Section 2 of
the Act also applies to trade or commerce with foreign nations, 26 Stat. 209 (1890),
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1958).
100. The Supreme Court of the United States has not gone this far. However, it has
applied the Sherman Act to international cartel arrangements which seem to have an
insignificant impact upon the interstate commerce of the United States. Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. United States, supra note 71, applied the Sherman Act to an international
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that Congress intended such an extra-territorial application of the

Sherman Act whenever such an application would be consistent with
international law principles of legislative jurisdiction. 1 1
The Clayton Act's applicability to foreign conduct is not so clear.
Section
Unlike
include
section

7 of that act refers to corporations engaged in "commerce."0 2
the Sherman Act, section 7 does not define "commerce" to
foreign commerce. Until now, the courts have not applied
7 to cases involving only foreign conduct. 10 3 However, the

Justice Department believes that Congress intended to include foreign

as well as interstate commerce within the term "commerce." 04 In
view of the absence of any impelling reason to the contrary, courts
are likely to accept the Justice Department's construction and apply
the Clayton Act extra-territorially to the extent that such an applica10 5
tion does not exceed the legislative jurisdiction of the United States.
cartel arrangement dividing world markets. The territorial arrangements treated the
United States as one market area, yet the arrangement was held to restrain interstate and foreign commerce. Id. at 595. Accord, on similar facts, United States v.
Aluminum Co., supra note 97; United States v. National Lead Co., supra note 96;
United States v. R. P. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Calif. 1957); United
States v. General Dyestuff Corp., 57 F. Supp. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1944). One recent
district court decision has gone all the way. United States v. Learner Co., 215 F. Supp.
603 (D. Hawaii 1963), involved United States foreign commerce exclusively. Several
west-coast exporters of scrap metal had entered a cartel arrangement with Japanese
steel mills. The arrangement allocated supply territories. Defendants had exclusive
control over the export of scrap metal from the west coast to Japan.
101. See note 97 supra and authorities cited therein.
102. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1950).
103. But see United States v. American Cyanamid Co., supra note 77, where a consent
decree terminating a prosecution under both the Sherman Act and section 7 of the
Clayton Act provided in Part XIII (D): "For a period of twenty . .. years . . .
Cyanamid is . . . enjoined . . .from aquiring . . . any . . . business . . . of . . .
any person engaged in any country outside the United States in the manufacture . . .
of . . . [the relevant products] where the effect of such acquisition will be substantially
to lessen competition in, or tend to create a monopoly in . .. the manufacture . . .
of any of .. . [the relevant products] .... ." Id. at 1 79,636 (Emphasis added.) The
italicized phrases are definitely section 7 language.
104. Orrick, supra note 85. Of course, it is not yet possible to tell whether Donald
F. Turner, who has succeeded to Mr. Orrick's position, will exploit this possibility.
There is certainly every reason to believe that he will. Moreover, the man who will
probably formulate Division policy on this particular question seems to be in accord
with Mr. Orrick. Mr. Wilbur L. Fugate, Chief of the Antitrust Division's Foreign
Commerce Section, takes the position that though the problems in foreign commerce
"are naturally quite different, as far as the law is concerned no difference is recognized."
Fugate, supra note 90.
105. Accord, Bridges, Foreign Mergers Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 52
A.B.A.J. 360 (1965); FuCATE, op. cit. supra note 76, at 254. Consider one additional
point on the competence of our courts to apply the antitrust laws to foreign commerce.
The Webb-Pomerene Act, 40 Stat. 517, ch. 50, § 2 (1918), 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1958),
excludes from the operation of the Sherman Act and Clayton Act otherwise prohibited agreements between United States exporters under certain limited circumstances. This exclusion is inapplicable to the Latin American joint venture. While one
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Thus, since the applicability of our antitrust laws to extra-territorial
conduct is ultimately a question of legislative jurisdiction, some consideration of that concept is appropriate at this point.
b. Legislative Jurisdiction.-Legislativejurisdiction is a relatively
new term for a concept of long standing. Broadly speaking it refers to
the legal ability of one country or state to make laws applicable to
given conduct. When the legislative jurisdiction of a country is in
question, principles of international law provide the answer.
Five principles of international law might be relevant in determining
whether the United States has legislative jurisdiction over the conduct
of a joint venture incorporated in a foreign country. Generally the
universality principle, determining jurisdiction according to the
country who has custody of the actor, and the passive personality
principle, determining jurisdiction according to the nationality of
the person injured, have not been applied in conjunction with antitrust
legislation. A third, the territorial principle, would compel a negative
answer to this inquiry. That principle gives legislative jurisdiction
to the country in which the conduct in question occurs. A similar result
would be reached under the nationality principle giving a country
legislative jurisdiction over the conduct of its own nationals. In contrast, the protective principle compels an affirmative answer. The
protective principle establishes legislative jurisdiction in the country
10 6
whose interests have been injured by the conduct in question.
The extra-territorial reach of United States antitrust laws was first
considered in the now famous case of American Banana Company
v. United Fruit Company.10 7 The Supreme Court's application of ttie
territorial principle in that case was thought to preclude the extraterritorial application of American antitrust laws for all time. 08 However, the current significance of the Banana case is extremely limited. 1 9
could argue that
Webb-Pomerene
exclusion was to
European export
AmincA

such ventures are agreements for the export of capital entitled to the
Act exclusion; the courts are unlikely to agree. The object of the
permit American commodity exporters to compete collectively against
cartels for foreign markets, F.T.C., REPORT ON COOPERATION N

EXPORT TRADE vol. 1, p. 8 (1916).

United States v. United States Alkali

Export Ass'n, 86 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), and United States v. Minnesota Mining
& Mfg. Co., supra note 72, make it clear that the Webb-Pomerene exception is narrow
and strictly construed in accordance with its limited purpose. For further discussion

of the Webb-Pomerene Act, see Simmons, Webb-Pomerene Act and Antitrust Policy,
1963 Wis. L. REv. 426 (1963).
106. The preceding paragraph relies reavily upon Harvard Research in International

Law: Jurisdictionwith Respect to Crime, 29 Am. J. INT'L L. Supr,. 443 (1935).
107. Supra note 77.

108. United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, supra note 105, at 67. See
also Haight, International Law and the Extra-territorialApplication of the Antitrust
Laws, 63 YALE LJ. 639, 639-40 (1954) (apparently outdated).
109. "Thus, after 54 years it is now appropriate to say, if you'll forgive me, in the

title of a famous American jazz song of the nineteen twenties, "Yes we have no
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Subsequent cases have indicated that the factual situation in Banana
prevented the application of the protective principle of international
law; today the territorial principle is no longer a viable limitation
upon the extra-territorial application of United States' antitrust laws." 0
Several attempts have been made to limit the extra-territorial application of our antitrust laws by invoking the nationality principle of
international law. However this principle has only a narrow range of
application. Only where the challenged conduct is specifically required by the foreign country in which it occurs will the nationality
principle shield it from the application of United States antitrust
laws."' The mere fact that the conduct proscribed by the United
States antitrust laws is permitted or encouraged by the foreign country
in which it occurs is no ground for invoking the principle." 2 Similarly,
though more a question of sovereign immunity than an application of
the nationality principle, the existence of a foreign government or a
foreign national interest in the properties involved does not insulate
the conduct." 3 The doctrine of sovereign immunity will insulate
Banana!" Now perhaps this is a bit strong, for Banana still stands for the limited
proposition that the antitrust laws do not apply to the actions of another sovereign
government in its own jurisdiction." Address by William H. Orrick, Jr., former Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, before the Conference on
Antitrust and the European Communities, in Brussels, Sept. 25, 1963.
110. United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 276 (1927), laid the groundwork for this process of distinction: "[The gist of that case was] that . . . a conspiracy in one country to do acts in another . . . does not draw to itself those acts
and make them unlawful, if they are permitted by the local law [of that other country]."
Following that lead, United States v. Aluminum Co., supra note 97, distinguished
Banana on the ground that there had been no allegation of an effect on United States
commerce in that case. Id. at 443. Subsequent cases have used the same basis of
distinction. United States v. Learner Co., supra note 100, at 606; United States v.
R. P. Oldham Co., supra note 100, at 822; Sanib Corp. v. United Fruit Co., supra
note 77, at 766; United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., supra note 77, at
237; United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, supra note 105, at 67; United
States v. National Lead Co., supra note 96, at 524-25.
111. United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., TaE
REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) ff 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (dicta); United States v.
General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (conduct required by foreign
government of country in which it took place was not in contempt of decree). In
accord are a number of consent decrees, United States v. Standard Oil Co., TRADE
REG. REP. (1960 Trade Cas.) ff 69,849 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); United States v. Gulf Oil
REP. (1960 Trade Cas.) 1 69,851 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); United States
Corp., TRADE R.
v. American Type Founders Co., TA.DE REc. REP. (1958 Trade Cas.) 1 69,065
(D.N.J. 1958); United States v. United Fruit Co., TRADE REr. REP. (1958 Trade Cas.)
f[ 68,941 (E.D. La. 1958). Contra, RESTATEM T, UNITED STATES FORMGN RELATIONS LAw § 29 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1958).
112. United States v. Learner Co., supra note 100; United States v. Watchmakers
of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., supra note 111; United States v. R. P.
Oldham Co., supra note 110.
113. United States v. General Dyestuff Corp., supra note 100 (foreign government);
Sanib Corp. v. United Fruit Co., supra note 77 (foreign national).
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only the conduct of a foreign government acting in its governmental

capacity. 1 4

The protective principle is now a well-established basis for extending the application of our antitrust laws beyond the territorial confines
of the United States." 5 Originally, the protective principle of international law was used to determine the outer-most limits upon the
extra-territorial application of a country's criminal laws." 6 In view of
the criminal nature of some of the offenses enumerated in our antitrust
laws, the application of this principle to our antitrust legislation is not
surprising." 7 While civil actions are now the rule rather than the
exception in antitrust litigation, the protective principle is still applicable; the civil offense under those laws is in the nature of an intentional tort-differing from the criminal offenses only in the nature of
the penalty imposed.
Broadly speaking, the protective principle justifies the extra-territorial extension of a country's legislative jurisdiction, when necessary,

in order to protect a substantial national interest. 18 In the antitrust

field there are only two interests which are legitimately protected by

antitrust legislation. One is the domestic businessman's interest in
free access to foreign markets and the other is the domestic consumer's
interest in getting the benefit of competition from foreign suppliers." 9
While the protective principle is now firmly established in American
antitrust jurisprudence, the application of that principle by our courts

has been at best haphazard.uo The Alcoa case 121 is generally thought
to be the first application of the protective principle in conjunction

114. When the foreign government acts in its own capacity the United States
courts could not get judicial jurisdiction, see note 94 supra and accompanying text. But
see United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199, 202 (S.D.N.Y.
1929), where a corporation owned entirely by a foreign government was held amenable
to a decree. "The defendant company being an entity distinct from its stockholders,
immunity cannot be claimed by it . . . on the ground that it and the government of
France are identical in any respect." Id. at 202.
115. See note 110 supra and cases cited therein. Two United States Supreme Court
cases have applied the protective principle to reach extra-territorial violations of the
Landam Act, Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952), and a conspiracy to
defraud a corporation with an American stockholder interest, United States v.
Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922) (although in this case, since the defendants had conspired within the territorial confines of the United States the territorial principle
was actually not necessary).
116. See note 106 supra and authorities cited therein.
117. Section 1 of the Sherman Act declares the proscribed acts unlawful, 26 Stat.
209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958). Section 2 declares the acts proscribed therein
misdemeanors, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1958).
118. See note 106 supra and authorities cited therein.
119. Brewster, supra note 70 at 357.
120. Apparently, many courts apply the concept without understanding the principle
or its derivation.
121. Supra note 97.
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with our antitrust laws. 2 2 The court spoke in general terms of "consequences within ... (our nation's) borders which . . . (our nation)
reprehends," suggesting that whenever an effect is felt internally the
United States might act extra-territorially to relieve it.12 Some cases,
following Alcoa's suggestion, have tended to apply the principle
mechanically. Rather than weigh all factors which might legitimately
bear upon the United States' interest in applying its antitrust laws to
a given situation,'m they merely inquire whether the extra-territorial
conduct has a direct and substantial effect upon the interstate or
foreign commerce of the United States. 125 Once found, it does not
matter how substantial that effect may be so long as it is not
insubstantial. 1 26 Other cases, dissatisfied with Alcoa's mechanistic ap-

proach, have determined the applicability of the protective principle
by considering all factors which legitimately bear upon the United
127
States' interest in applying its antitrust laws to a given situation.
122. See Skiold, supra note 96. Actually, however, United States v. Sisal Sales Corp.,
supra note 110, introduced the principle: "[Tihe conspirators . . . by their own deliberate acts, here and elsewhere, brought about forbidden results within the United
States. They are within the jurisdiction of our courts and may be punished for offenses
against our laws." Id. at 274. As the quotation indicates, some of the conduct involved
took place in the United States. Yet those acts, by themselves, would not have
constituted a violation of the Sherman Act. In order to bring the extra-territorial
conduct into consideration, the territorial principle was necessary.
123. Supra note 97, at 443.
124. For example, consider the relevance of the following factors to the question
whether the United States has a legitimate interest in applying its antitrust laws to
extra-territorial conduct: (1) the actual or potential effect of the conduct on competition in the interstate commerce of the United States; (2) the actual or potential
effect of the conduct on the access of United States business to foreign markets; (3)
the actual or potential effect of the conduct on the access of foreign business to
United States markets; and (4) the actual or potential effects of the conduct on any
other economic objective of the United States.
125. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951);
United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950);
United States v. National Lead Co., supra note 96; United States v. Aluminum Co.,
supra note 97; United States v. American Cyanimid Co., supra note 77; United States
v. Learner Co., supra note 100; United States v. United Fruit, supra note 77; Sanib
Corp. v. United Fruit Co., supra note 77. It is interesting to note, however, that
all of these cases, with the exception of the last two, involved commerce between the
United States and the developed countries of the world, see notes 77-78 supra and
accompanying text. In both of the last cited cases a different result would be unlikely under the more liberal construction of the protective principle, see note 127
infra accompanying text.
126. In a recent case following the Timken approach, the court held that a conspiracy to fix prices on a commodity is an unreasonable restraint on trade per se if
it affects United States interstate or foreign commerce: "the amount of the interstate
or foreign trade involved is immaterial." United States v. Leaner Co., supra note
100, at 605. Of course, that statement must be modified in light of substantial
amount of foreign commerce involved in that case.
127. In Alfred Bell & Co., Ltd., v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir.
1951), the court held that the United States' interest in enforcing American patent
rights outweighed the United States' interest in applying the Sherman Act to an extra-
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It is obvious that this interpretation of the protective principle may
modify the application of antitrust principles. The extent of that
modification will now be examined as this discussion turns to the
extra-territorial application of our antitrust laws to the methods of
direct investment in Latin America.
V. THE POTENTIAL CONFLICT EXAMINED-THE EXTRA-TERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAWS TO THE METHODS

OF DIRECT PRIVATE INVESTMENT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE ROLE OF
THE AMERICAN CORPORATION IN THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
OF LATIN AMERICA

Part IV discussed the possibility that our antitrust laws might apply
extra-territorially to the American investment activities in Latin
America. That possibility gives rise to a potential for conflict between
our antitrust laws and United States' foreign policy encouraging those
investment activities. If there is any actual conflict, it must arise
because the extra-territorial application of our antitrust laws prohibits
or threatens to prohibit arrangements that American corporations find
essential for sound investment in those countries. On the basis of
the conclusions reached in Part III, this examination may be limited
to the application of United States antitrust laws to foreign joint
ventures and ancilliary price-fixing and market allocation arrange-

ments.
Two questions will be answered here. One is how the courts and
the Justice Department are likely to view such arrangements. The
other is whether antitrust considerations deter the use of such arrangements by the business community.
A. The Extra-TerritorialApplication of the United States
Antitrust Laws to the Methods of DirectInvestment and
Their Ancillary Arrangements
1. The ForeignJoint Venture.-The case-law concerning the foreign
joint venture is virtually useless for the purposes of this investigation.
territorial price-fixing arrangement.

Accord, on the balancing of interests approach,

United States v. R. P. Oldham Co., supra note 100. See also discussion in note 83
supra and accompanying text; Dean, Statement before the Congressional Hearings,

Hart Committee Hearings 85: "In no event do I believe a U.S. Court should entertain
an antitrust proceeding arising out of conduct outside the United States, unless the
impact of that conduct on U.S. trade is so substantial, and our ability to punish that
conduct appears so important to our economic well-being, that our interest in regulating

that conduct outweighs what should otherwise be a normal policy of deferring out of
comity, to the courts of the foreign nations most directly concerned." It is interesting
to note that most of these cases involved commerce between the United States and
the underdeveloped countries of the world.
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In the first place all of the relevant cases involve complex business

arrangements in which the joint venture is coupled with restrictive
ancillary agreements: cartel connections, price-fixing and division of

world markets. 12 In addition, most of the applications of our antitrust

laws to foreign joint ventures have involved joint ventures in the
developed countries rather than in underdeveloped ones where they

have greater economic and business justifications.m

Some of the

dicta in these cases are helpful. Yet the bulk of the following discus-

sion will rely upon a logical extension of existing legal principles
applicable to domestic joint ventures with such modifications as are
required by principles of international law. Based upon the discussion
in Part IV, this is the approach that the courts are most likely to take.
The highly uncertain status of the foreign joint venture under the

antitrust laws of the United States has been a constant source of
concern among commentators, the practicing bar and the business

community. 130 In large measure this uncertainty is due to the possible
applicability of two substantially variant lines of case-law dealing with

domestic joint ventures-one line construing the Sherman Act and the
other construing section seven of the Clayton Act. While the line

of cases under the Clayton Act has apparently superseded the cases

under the Sherman Act regarding domestic joint ventures,13 ' until the

applicability of the Clayton Act to foreign conduct is definitely estab128. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, supra note 125 (allocation of trade territories & participation in international cartels); United States v.
National Lead Co., supra note 96 (world market allocations); United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911) (world market allocations); United States
v. Learner Co., supra note 100 (allocation of supply territories, price-fixing & exclusive
sales agencies); United States v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 18
(S.D.N.Y. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 371 U.S. 296 (1963) (allocation of markets);
United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952)
(allocation of markets); United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., supra note
125 (market division on a world scale); United States v. General Dyestuff Corp.,
supra note 100 (market allocations).
129. Compare cases cited in note 125 supra, with those cited in note 127 supra.
130. Commentaries on the problem are too numerous to list. See, e.g., Gesell,
Joint Ventures and the Prosecutor, 10 ANrnusT BuLL. 31 (1965). The unpublished
Report of the Joint Committee on Antitrust Problems in International Trade and Investment, July 7, 1962, evidences the concern of the practicing bar. Celler, A Congressman's View of the Foreign Commerce Aspects of the Sherman Act, Symposium on
Trade Associations, 27 A.B.A. ANTrrrUST SEC. 1, 6 (1965), records the anxiety of the
business community.
131. "The legislative history of the amendment makes it plain that Congress intended
by § 7 to forbid mergers [and joint ventures, not 143 infra) which were beyond
the reach of the Sherman Act as judicially interpreted. . . . Thus under § 7 as
amended the Sherman Act test is no longer appropriate . . . and conduct may fall
under the ban of amended § 7 before it has attained the stature of an unreasonable
restraint of trade." American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 359
F.2d 524, 527 (2d Cir. 1958).
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lished, the132foreign joint venture is potentially subject to either line of
authority.
Under the Sherman Act joint ventures are not necessarily illegal.
Yet their inherent tendency to eliminate competition renders them
fit subjects for close, case-by-case scrutiny by the courts.'3 While
few concrete rules have developed out of these ad hoc decisions, some
generalizations can be made. Like any other business arrangement, a
domestic joint venture will run afoul of the Sherman Act if organized
or used for the purpose of restraining competition13 4 Likewise, a
business motivated domestic joint venture between substantial competitors may be illegal per se because of its inevitable anticompetitive
consequences; 1 later cases evidence a reluctance to consider economic
or business justifications for joint ventures that eliminate competition
between substantial competitors. 136 On the other hand, business
motivated joint ventures between firms which do not compete are
generally legal. 3 7 Between these two extremes the courts are taking
a rule-of-reason approach to business-motivated joint venturesweighing the actual restraint on competition against the justifications
for the particular joint venture."3 In determining whether there is
132. See notes 102-05 supra and accompanying text.
133. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 151-54 (1948).
134. While the original combining of interests may be lawful, the manner in which
an interest is subsequently used may bring the combination within the condemnation
of the Sherman Act. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., supra note 133;
United States v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., supra note 128. Accord, United
States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours, & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1955), aff'd, 351
U.S. 377 (1956) (dicta); United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 105
F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (dicta). Likewise, a joint venture which is the fruit
or culmination of monopolistic practices or is motivated by anticompetitive purposes
violates the Sherman Act. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., supra note
133 (order divestiture to the extent that the joint ventures were the fruits of monopolistic
or restrictive practices); United States v. Crescent Amusement, 323 U.S. 183 (1944);
United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., supra.
135. This principle developed out of a long line of cases holding that competing railroads could not merge, see FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AD THE ANTrTRUST LAWS 260
(1958).
136. Witness, for example, the short-shrift manner in which the United States Supreme
Court dealt with a joint venture between competitors in United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., supra note 133, at 149: "[These joint ventures] were bald efforts to
substitute monopoly for competition and to strengthen the hold of the exhibitordefendants on the industry by alignment of competitors on their side. Clearer restraints of trade are difficult to imagine." Of course, the facts in that case evidence
a long history of monopolization which seemed to convince the court that the only
motives for the joint ventures were anticompetitive.
137. United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158, 161 (1964); United
States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., supranote 133.
138. "In short, we see no reason to place a ban on this type of ownership ....
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., supra note 133, at 151. Accord, United
States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours, & Co., supra note 134, at 222; United States
v. United States Rubber Co., TAADE Rc. R . (1954 Trade Cas.) f[67,771 (S.D.N.Y.
1954) (consent judgment enjoined market allocations, limitations on production, price-
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any actual restraint the controlling issues are whether the joint

venturers are actual competitors, and if so whether the joint undertaking has actually eliminated that competition. 139 Potential competition between the joint venturers is not a factor to be considered. 40
Equally irrelevant is the possibility of a restraint on potential competition between the joint venture and one or more of the joint venturers. 141
When applying the Clayton Act, the courts seem to take a much
dimmer view of domestic joint venturers. 42 Section 7 forbids
joint ventures between corporations whenever the effect "may be

substantially to lessen competition." 143 The emphasis is on the reasonable probability of anticompetitive effects.'" The act itself makes
no provision for consideration of countervailing economic or business
justifications for a domestic joint venture, 45 but the extent to which
the courts will consider such factors is still an open question. 146 Under
section 7 the courts assess the venture's effects upon any potential
fixing and interlocking directorates, but permitted joint ownership). See also United

States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., supra note 134, at 557; Devine, Foreign
Establishment and the Antitrust Law: A Study of the Antitrust Consequences of tle
Principal Forms of Investment by American Corporations In Foreign Markets, 57
Nw. U.L. REv. 400, 440 (1960); 26 OMo ST. L.J. 439, 444-45 (1965).
139. See, e.g., United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948). See also
FuGATE, op. cit. supra note 135, at 265.
140. United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., supranote 137, at 161.
141. See United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours, & Co., supra note 134. See also
Bernstein, Joint Ventures in the Light of Recent Antitrust Developments: Anticompetitive Joint Ventures, 10 AN -rrUSTBuLL. 25, 26 (1965).
142. Gesell, supra note 130, at 33.
143. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1950). The same section
also forbids joint ventures which "tend to create a monopoly." Ibid. This second
test is not apt to be relevant to the subject matter of this paper.
While some doubt did exist at one time whether § 7 would apply to joint ventures,
the Celler-Kefauver amendment of 1950 dismissed it. Congress contemplated that the
1950 admendment would . ..bring the entire range of corporate amalgamations .
within the scope of § 7." United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 342
(1963).
144. United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); United States
v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., supra note 137. Were it otherwise, section 7 would be
inconsistent with the purpose of the Clayton Act-arresting anticompetitive arrangements at their incipiency, see United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 516
(S.D.N.Y. 1958). See also Bernstein, supra note 141, at 26.
145. See note 142 supra.
146. See United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., supra note 137. In that case the
Supreme Court did not foreclose consideration of economic or business justifications.
Yet its under-emphasis of such considerations has been noted and criticised, 17 VAND.
L. REv. 1502, 1505-06 (1964). One writer went so far as to conclude that such considerations are irrelevant under section 7, see Gesell, supra note 130, at 33. In view
of the position of Donald F. Turner, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust
Division, see notes 171-72 infra and accompanying text, the courts are not likely to go
that far. Instead, they are more apt to treat section 7 as raising a rebuttable
presumption against joint ventures which show a reasonable probability of having
substantial anticompetitive effects.
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competition. 4 7 Competition between the joint venturers inter sese as
well as that between either joint venturer and the joint venture itself
may be considered.148 Thus, if each of the venturers are likely to
enter a market on their own, a joint venture between them to exploit
that market would probably be illegal. 149 Likewise, if a joint venture,
initially organized to exploit one market into which neither venturer
was likely to proceed alone, has potential for competition with one of
the venturers for another market, such a venture may violate
section 7.150
In view of these highly variant and as yet uncertain standards, the
concern shared by the commentators, practicing bar and business
community is easy to understand. Curiously, however, when the
joint venture is removed from the domestic setting to a foreign
country, some of the legal uncertainty may disappear.' 5 '
If the courts decide to apply the Clayton Act to Latin American
joint ventures, the protective principle of international law may require
substantial modification of the existing case-law construing section
7.152 Recall the lenient tendencies of the courts when applying
United States antitrust laws to commerce between the United States
and the less developed countries of the world. 153 Apparently, that
leniency has led to a rejection of the mechanical interpretation of
the protective principle, i.e., that a mere finding of a direct and
substantial impact upon United States commerce is sufficient to
justify extra-territorial application.'5 Instead, when faced with joint
ventures operating in underdeveloped countries, the majority of courts
have construed the protective principle more conservatively. Thus,
they have used it to justify extra-territorial extention of our antitrust
laws only when compelled by a consideration of all factors having a
legitimate bearing upon the United States' interest in applying its
147. Bernstein, supra note 141, at 27.
148. Ibid.
149. United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., supra note 137 (found potential
competition between the joint venturers); United States v. Columbia Steel Co., supra
note 139 (Court could find no potential competition between merging companies).
"[W]hen the prosecutor chooses to proceed he will be very likely to succeed if the
joint ventures are actual or probably competitors." Gesell, supra note 130, at 33.
150. This seems a logical extention of the Penn-Olin rationale, supra note 137. Accord,
Bernstein, supra note 141, at 27.
151. This is contrary to popular opinion, see note 130 supra and authorities cited
therein. "It may be that the antitrust bar should question whether it may have been
too cautious in its advice and as a result has perhaps permitted unnecessarily a state
of apprehension to be created in the business community." Celler, supra note 130, at
6.
152. For a discussion of the protective principle see notes 115-27 supra and accompanying text.
153. See notes 80-83 supra and accompanying text.
154. See note 127 supra and accompanying text.
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antitrust legislation to the joint venture under consideration. 5 In
effect, this construction of the protective principle superimposes upon
section 7 something like the Sherman Act "rule-of-reason" approach
to domestic joint ventures.
Several hypotheticals will illustrate how this modification comes
about. The following discussion assumes that the foreign joint venture
is business motivated and not organized or availed of for the purpose
of destroying or preventing competition. The legality of foreign joint
ventures will be analyzed in four situations: (1) a joint venture
between an American corporation and a Latin American national or
government for the purpose of exploiting Latin American markets; (2)
a joint venture between American competitors for the purpose of
exploiting Latin American markets; (3) a joint venture between
American competitors for the primary purpose of exploiting Latin
American markets with some export to the United States; and (4)
a joint venture between an American corporation and a Latin American national or government for the purpose of exploiting United
States markets.
a. First Hypothetical.-A Latin American joint venture between an
American corporation and a Latin American national or government
for the purpose of exploiting Latin American markets. Consider a
hypothetical joint venture between a major American oil company
and a Colombian oil producer for the purpose of constructing a refinery and marketing petroleum products in Colombia. Prior to this
joint undertaking the Colombian firm was extracting crude oil for sale
in Colombia and had no potential for expanding its facilities to supply
a foreign market. Likewise, the American firm did not have sufficient
capital to enter Colombia on its own. The joint refinery does not have
a capacity permitting export to foreign markets.
Clearly, under existing principles of antitrust law this joint venture
would be legal.158 Moreover, even if the protective principle were
applied mechanistically, no direct and substantial effect on United
States commerce exists to justify the extra-territorial application of
those laws to this foreign joint venture.'51
b. Second Hypothetical.-A Latin American joint venture between
American competitors for the purpose of exploiting Latin American
markets. Suppose that a major American oil company, desirous of
155. See notes 83 & 127 supra and accompanying text.
156. Since there is no combination of competitors actual or potential and since the
joint venture is not a potential competitor with either joint venturer, neither section
7 of the Clayton Act nor the Sherman Act rule of per se illegality would apply.
Clearly, the rule of reason would vindicate this joint venture.
157. Compare note 125 supra and accompanying text.
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exploiting Colombian markets for refined petroleum products, is
unable to find a Colombian firm interested in a joint undertaking.
Unable to finance such an undertaking on its own, it combines with an
American competitor in a Colombian joint venture. The joint operation has no export potential.
Unlike the first hypothetical, this joint venture is suspect under
existing principles of antitrust law. If the American corporations are
substantial competitors the arrangement may be illegal per se under
the Sherman Act. 5 8 If they are not substantial competitors, the ruleof-reason approach would probably vindicate the arrangement in light
of the substantial business and economic justifications. 5 9 On the other
hand, if the courts were to apply the Clayton Act to this joint venture,
those justifications might be irrelevant
even though the corporations
160
are not substantial competitors.
Once again, however, the protective principle will not justify the
extra-territorial application of United States antitrust principles to
this joint venture. There is no effect on United States commerce.
c. Third Hypothetical.-A Latin American joint venture between
American competitors for the primary purpose of exploiting Latin
American markets with some export to the United States. Suppose
that the hypothetical joint venture just considered expands, enabling it
to export some of the refined petroleum products to the United States.
Now two American competitors are carrying on a joint venture which
also competes with them for United States markets.
As in the preceding hypothetical, this joint venture may be illegal
under either line of domestic case-law. There is some possibility that
6
the Sherman Act rule of reason might vindicate the arrangement.' '
However, under the Clayton Act the case against this joint venture
is even stronger than that against the one in the preceding hypothe62
tical
Unlike the preceding hypothetical, a mechanical application of the
protective principle will not insulate this joint venture from the
application of United States antitrust laws. Since the joint venture
exports to the United States, the effect on United States commerce
is not insubstantial. 163 In contrast, the majority of American courts
might find that the protective principle did not justify the extra-territorial extension of those laws to this joint venture. They would
consider all factors having a legitimate bearing upon the United
158. Compare note 136 supra and accompanying text.

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

See United States v. Pan American World Airways, supranote 128.
Compare notes 45-46 supra and accompanying text.
Compare United States v. Pan American World Airways, supra note 128.
Compare notes 45-46 supra and accompanying text.
Compare note 126 supra and accompanying text.
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States' interest in such an extension. 16 Several of those factors militate
against such an extension. First, the joint venture promises to stabilize
the Colombian economy by diversifying its industrial and export
capacities beyond the primary product field; the United States' foreign
policy objective-the economic development of Latin America-is being
advanced to that extent. 16 5 Second, the joint venture has created a
new source of supply for the United States' markets which would
not have been possible otherwise. 16 Finally, unless some further
collusion takes place between the American corporations and the
joint venture, competition in the supply of petroleum products to
the United States has increased. On the other hand, the only
relevant factor justifying an extra-territorial application of our antitrust laws to this joint venture is the possibility that the American
corporations will use their ownership interest in the joint venture to
eliminate this new source of competition. 6 7 On the basis of this
analysis, the majority of American courts would conclude that the
United States has no substantial interest in applying its antitrust laws
to this joint venture.
d. Fourth Hypothetical.-A Latin American joint venture between
an American corporation and a Latin American national or government
for the purpose of exploiting United States markets. Consider a
hypothetical joint venture between a major American oil company
and a Colombian oil producer for the purpose of constructing a refinery and exporting petroleum products to the United States. Prior to
the joint undertaking, the Colombian firm extracted crude oil for
Colombian markets and had no potential for expanding its facilities.
The American oil company had considered a solo operation in Colombia. However, the high risks of Latin American investment militated
against that possibility. The proposed joint venture was an ideal
solution.
Under the existing Sherman Act principles this joint venture would
be perfectly legal. The joint venturers were not actual competitors
164. Compare note 83 supra and accompanying text.
165. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
166. A dissolution of the proposed joint venture would eliminate this source of
supply unless a Latin American purchaser can be found for the American corporations'
interests. In view of the limited availability of investment capital in Latin America,
see note 20 supra and accompanying text, this is unlikely. Even if such a purchaser
were found, the venture would lack the technological and managerial assistance which
the American corporations would have supplied and the Latin American industry so
desperately needs.
167. One might argue that the United States' current balance of payments difficulty
militates an application of the Clayton Act to this joint venture. Yet even under the
present administration's hard-nosed approach to foreign investment generally, private
investment in Latin America is recognized as a plus factor in the balance of payments
picture, see note 60 supra.
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prior to the joint undertaking. When the rule of reason is applied
there will be no actual anticompetitive effects to offset the several
obvious business and economic justifications. Potential competition
between the joint venture and the American corporation will not be
considered.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act would require a consideration of
the potential competition between the joint venture and the American
corporation. However, the emphasis of section 7 is on the reasonable probability of anticompetitive effects.'
Several factors
militate against the possibility that the American corporation might
use its interest to eliminate competition between itself and the joint
venture. The first is the existence of the Latin American interest.
That interest will resist any attempt by the American corporation to
thwart the purpose of the joint undertaking. Second, the American
corporation entered the venture for the purpose of creating a competitor. Finally, if the joint venture is able to compete in the American
markets at an advantage over the American corporation, the American
corporation will realize the profits in the form of dividends. On the
balance there is no reasonable probability of anticompetitive effects.
Aside from the modifications required by the protective principle,
United States antitrust laws would probably not condemn this joint
venture.
Of course, a mechanistic application of the protective principle
would prohibit the foregoing analysis. Some courts would find United
States' antitrust laws applicable because of the joint venture's export
to the United States. Clearly, that export has a direct and substantial
effect on United States commerce.
However, the majority of American courts would probably find that
the protective principle did not justify the extra-territorial extension of
the Clayton or Sherman Acts to this joint venture. Considering all
factors having a legitimate bearing upon the United States' interest in
such an extension, they would conclude, on the basis of an analysis
substantially the same as that in the third hypothetical, that this joint
venture threatens no substantial United States interest. 10
The preceding hypotheticals illustrate that the majority of our courts
would reach substantially the same result whether they apply the
Sherman Act or the Clayton Act to a Latin American joint venture.
In most cases the economic and business justifications relevant to the
Sherman Act rule of reason would also be relevant in determining
whether the protective principle justifies an extra-territorial extension
of the Clayton Act. While the Clayton Act's consideration of potential
168. See note 144 supra and accompanying text.
169. See note 168 supra and accompanying text.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 19

competition still distinguishes it from the Sherman Act emphasis upon
actual competition, the majority construction of the protective principle considerably reduces the importance of that consideration.
The first two hypotheticals also illustrate that unless the venture
exports its produce to the United States, not even the mechanistic
construction of the protective principle will justify the extra-territorial
application of United States antitrust laws to a business-motivated,
Latin American joint venture.
When there are such exports, as in hypotheticals three and four,
only those courts construing the protective principle mechanically
are likely to condemn a business-motivated venture. Moreover, their
condemnation is likely only where the joint venture is between
American competitors as in hypothetical three. Where an American
corporation and a Latin American national or government join forces
for the express purpose of exporting to the United States, these courts
may attempt to apply the Clayton Act. Yet in that situation, as in
hypothetical four, section 7 will not condemn the joint venture.
The only uncertainty under existing case-law is that surrounding
the combination of American competitors in a Latin American joint
venture exporting produce to the United States. If the combination
is business-motivated, a majority of American courts will not apply
United States antitrust laws to the joint venture. However, the
possibility that those American courts construing the protective
principle mechanically may apply section 7 puts the legal status
of such joint ventures in doubt.
With this analysis of the case-law in mind, consider the Justice
Department's position.
Though the justice Department has been criticized for an inconsistent enforcement policy,7 0 the truth seems to be that the varied
settings in which joint ventures have been found rather than variation
in enforcement policy have created the incoherent record. For some
time now the Justice Department has followed a policy of judging each
individual joint venture by its nature, purpose and effect. 1 ' That
policy is likely to continue in the future' 72
The Justice Department can be expected to push hard for the
170. See, e.g., Gesell, supra note 130, at 34.
171. Address by William H. Orrick, Jr., former Assistant Attorney General in charge
of the Antitrust Division, before the Conference on Antitrust and the European Communities, in Brussels, Sept. 25, 1963.
172. Donald F. Turner, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division,
is evidently in favor of guide-lines in the merger area, see Wall Street Journal, Dec.
16, 1965, p. 1, col. 1. Yet in the joint venture area he seems to be in favor of a
case-by-case approach. Address by Donald F. Turner, before the Eighteenth Annual
Meeting of the Antitrust Law Section of the New York Bar Association, in New York
City, Feb. 2, 1966.
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application of the Clayton Act to foreign joint ventures. 173 In this
regard the Department's current interpretation of the protective
principle is particularly interesting. Evidently the Antitrust Division
still follows the mechanistic test, i.e., is there a direct and substantial
effect on United States commerce. 7 4 Consider the impact of this
construction of the protective principle on the Clayton Act's emphasis
on potential competition. Without more, Latin American joint ventures for the purpose of exploiting Latin American markets do not
involve any direct or substantial effect on United States commerce315
However, if the joint venture had a potential for competition in
American markets, an application of section 7 of the Clayton Act
might be possible. Yet it seems unlikely that a mere potential for
competition would have any direct and substantial effect on United
States commerce. Only where such ventures actually compete for
American markets will the Justice Department's construction of the
protective 176
principle justify an extra-territorial application of our antitrust laws.
This construction of the protective principle may explain the
absence of any substantial number of prosecutions against Latin
American joint ventures. The Antitrust Division's Foreign Commerce
Section apparently feels that most Latin American joint ventures pose
77
little or no competitive threat to United States producers.
When and if the Department does take a closer look at joint ventures
in Latin America, it will do so with a view of the law substantially
the same as that taken by the courts in domestic cases. Evidently
the Antitrust Division is in favor of a rule-of-reason approach, taking
advantage of whatever presumption section seven of the Clayton Act
may provide in its favor. 7 8 Of course, where the joint venture is
organized or used to eliminate competition, the Department can be
expected to act without regard to business or economic justifications.7 9
Absent such anticompetitive motives, joint ventures which are reasonably necessary for sound investment in Latin America will probably
not call forth Justice Department objections. 180
173. Supra note 104 and accompanying text. The Antitrust Division hopes to use

the Clayton Act to raise a presumption of illegality when the joint ventures anticompetitive consequences are reasonably probable. See Turner, supra note 172.
174. Orrick, supranote 171.
175. See hypotheticals 1 & 2 above.
176. See hypotheticals 3 &4 above.
177. Interview with Wilbur L. Fugate, Chief of the Foreign Commerce Section of
the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, in Washington, D.C., Dec. 29, 1965.
178. See note 173 supra.
179. Orrick, supra note 171.
180. "I believe that there is hardly an area of antitrust law where understanding
and analysis could not be improved by asking the question 'Is this restraint reasonably
necessary to carry out an object which is deserving of antitrust regard?"' Turner,
supra note 172 (referring specifically to joint ventures).
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The foregoing discussion assumed that the American corporation
did not object to the joint venture's potential for competing in the
American markets. Suppose the American joint venturer did object.
For example, consider a hypothetical joint venture between an
American corporation and a Colombian oil company for the purpose
of constructing a refinery for the production of gasoline for sale in
Colombia. At the present time, the Colombian market for gasoline
has not developed to the point where it would support a refinery large
enough to be economical.' 8 ' Yet both interests foresee a rapid expansion of that market in the near future-probably by the time the
refinery reaches its full productive capacity.
Under Colombian law, local business operations must have local
stockholder control. 182 The American corporation realizes that the
Latin American participants may decide to export gasoline to the
United States if the Colombian market does not expand as rapidly
as anticipated.'83 This possibility poses a substantial competitive
threat. Due to the extremely cheap labor supply in Colombia and the
low cost of Colombian crude oil, the joint venture might be able to
place gasoline on the United States market at a price below that
now prevailing there. 18
In order to dispel this anticipation, the Colombian oil company
proposes two alternative agreements. Under the first alternative the
Colombian joint venture would agree not to sell gasoline on the
American market at a price below that prevailing there at the time
of the sale. Under the second alternative the Colombian joint venture
and the American corporation would divide the American market,
each agreeing not to sell gasoline in the other's territory. Both alternatives are limited in time-just long enough for the Colombian market
for gasoline to expand.
Either agreement will overcome the American corporation's objec181. Compare note 21 supra and accompanying text. The present low standard of
living in most Latin American countries makes general ownership of automobiles
unlikely.
The following discussion assumes that the American corporation decides to make a
large initial investment, rather than a small one designed to establish a factory just
large enough to satisfy the current Latin American demand. Obviously, the possibility
of making a small initial investment provides one method by which an American
corporation may protect itself from the joint venture's competition. But see BnnwsTEn,
AN'nmrUsT AND AxmxucAN BusINEss ABROAD 77-78 (1958) (Does the foreign commerce clause in the Sherman Act refer to capital as well as goods? If so, what effect
does this have on the possible application of the antitrust laws to anticompetitive
dealings in capital?). Yet small initial investments may be uneconomical, particularly
when the need for rapid expansion is imminently likely.
182. Compare note 62 supra and accompanying text.
183. For a discussion of the likelihood of such a decision see notes 63-65 supra
and accompanying text.
184. See discussion in note 66 supra.
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tions. The issue is whether United States antitrust laws would prevent
their enforcement.
2. The First Ancillary Agreement-Price Fixing.-Section 1 of the
Sherman Act forbids any contract, combination or conspiracy within
the territorial confines of the United States for the purpose of fixing
the price on goods offered for sale to the American consumer.1' At
an early date the courts abandoned the impossible task of applying
the rule of reason to price-fixing arrangements and adopted instead
a rule of per se illegality, forbidding price-fixing in any form regardless of the business or economic justifications that might seem
apposite. 18 6 Whether the parties to the arrangement be economically
strong or weak; 1 87 whether the arrangement be horizontal, as between
competitors, or vertical, as in resale price maintenance;'8 whether the
arrangement be open and direct or covert and devious; 89 whether the
price set be fair or unreasonable; 90 or whether the arrangement be
185. Prices are fixed when they are agreed upon, United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed.
272, 291 (6th Cir. 1898), was the first case to hold that price-fixing arrangements fall
within the prohibition of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
186. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927), laid the basis
for the per se rule with the following rationale: "The aim and result of every pricefixing agreement, if effective, is the elimination of one form of competition. The
power to fix prices, whether reasonably exercised or not, involves the power to control
the market and to fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices. .. .Agreements which create
such potential power may well be held to be in themselves unreasonable or unlawful
restraints, without the necessity of minute inquiry whether a particular price is
reasonable or unreasonable as fixed and without placing on the government in enforcing
the Sherman Law the burden of ascertaining from day to day whether it has become
unreasonable through the mere variation of economic conditions." Id. at 397-98. The
expression "illegal per se" first appeared in United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S.
265, 274 (1942). There, after christening the rule, the Court went on to explain its
significance: "Since there was price-fixing, the fact that there were business reasons
which made the arrangements desirable to the appellees, the fact that the effect of
the combination may have been to increase the distribution of hardboard without
increase in price to the consumer or even to promote competition between dealers,
or the fact that from other points of view the arrangements might be deemed to have
desirable consequences would be no more legal justification .... ." Id. at 276. Today,
the literal validity of that statement is beyond any doubt, see, e.g., United States v.
McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956).
187. The existence of market control is unnecessary, United States v. McKesson &
Robbins, Inc., supranote 186.
188. Two of the latest cases condemning horizontal price-fixing are Independent Iron
Works, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 322 F.2d 656 (9th Cir. 1963), and Northern
Calif. Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States, 306 F.2d 374 (9th Cir. 1962). The latest
United States Supreme Court case dealing with resale price maintenance is Simpson
v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964), 18 VAND. L. REv. 222 (1964).
189. See American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921),
in which the Supreme Court of the United States struck down a price-fixing arrangement of the most elusive variety.
190. That the price fixed is reasonable or permits only a reasonable rate of return
is no defense, see United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., supra note 186. Nor is it
defensible to fix prices at the going market level for the commodity, United States v.
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successful or ineffectual; 191 an arrangement to fix prices is illegal per se.

Aside from the modifications required by the protective principle
of international law, 192 the courts have applied the same rule to
price-fixing arrangements conceived outside of the United States. 0 3
In contrast to their position in regard to foreign joint ventures, a
majority of the courts seem to apply the mechanistic interpretation of

the protective principle when dealing with extra-territorial price-fixing

arrangements. 94 Thus applied, the protective principle has required
no modification of the per se rule of illegality where the price-fixing

arrangement has had a direct and substantial effect on the commerce
of the United States. 195 Where the effect on United States commerce
has been indirect or insubstantial the courts have simply refused to

apply the Sherman Act. 196 Between these two extremes there is no
case authority.

One interesting question to which our courts have alluded may
Socony-Vacuum Oil, supra note 185. Even though the ultimate effect of the arrangement may be increased competition, if the arrangement is to fix prices it is illegal per
se, United States v. Masonite Corp., supra note 186. Whatever the motive, be it good
or bad, it cannot vindicate a price-fixing arrangement, United States v. McKesson &
Robbins, Inc., supra note 186.
191. The leading authority on this point is United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil,
supra note 185, at 224 n.59: "[I]t is well established that a person 'may be guilty
of conspiring, although incapable of committing the objective offense.' . . . And it is
likewise well settled that conspiracies under the Sherman Act are not dependent on
any overt act other than the act of conspiring.... It is the 'contract, combination . . .
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce' which § 1 of the Act strikes down,
whether the concerted activity be wholly nascent or abortive on the one hand, or
successful on the other. . . . Price-fixing agreements may or may not be aimed at
complete elimination of price competition. The group making those agreements may
or may not have power to control the market. But the fact that the group cannot
control the market price does not necessarily mean that the agreement as to prices
has no utility to the members of the combination. The effectiveness of price-fixing
agreements is dependent on many factors . . . . Whatever economic justification
particular price-fixing agreements may be thought to have, the law does not permit
an inquiry into their reasonableness. They are all banned because of their actual
or potential threat to the central nervous system of the economy."
192. See notes 115-27 supra and accompanying text for general discussion of the
protective principle.
193. See United States v. Learner Co., 215 F. Supp. 603 (D. Hawaii 1963); United
States v. R. P. Oldham Co., 154 F. Supp. 878 (N.D. Calif. 1957). But see United
States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) (some of dicta suggests a
more liberal approach).
194. Alfred Bell & Co., Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951);
United States v. Aluminum Co., supra note 193; United States v. Learner Co., supra
note 193; United States v. R. P. Oldham Co., supra note 193; United States v. Timken
Roller Bearing Co., 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
195. United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., supra note 194; United States v.
Aluminum Co., supra note 193; United States v. Learner Co., supra note 193; United
States v. R. P. Oldham Co., supra note 193; United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
196. Alfred Bell & Co., Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., supra note 194; United
States v. Aluminum Co., supra note 193 (dictum).
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prove to be the undoing of the mechanistic interpretation of the
protective principle in this area. The case-law applicable to domestic
price-fixing arrangements forbids such arrangements regardless of their
effectiveness. 19 7 The Alcoa case' 98 raised the question whether an
extra-territorial agreement to fix prices in United States imports would
be subject to the application of the Sherman Act if the agreement
were ineffectual. 199 The court did not decide the question, but assumed, arguendo, that the answer would be no.2°0 To this day that
question remains open. Clearly, however, a mechanistic application of
the protective principle would prohibit an affirmative answer. 2 1 Thus,
if faced with a blatant extra-territorial attempt to fix prices in United
States imports, our courts would be powerless to enforce the legitimate
interest of the United States in punishing such conduct unless they
could find an effect on prices. No doubt, in such a case our courts
would be unanimous in adopting the more conservative application of
the protective principle to permit the application of our antitrust laws.
With the door thus opened, perhaps the more liberal approach could
be extended to modify the per se rule regarding price-fixing when
other equally important United States interests so demand. Such
extensions could conceivably lead to something like a rule-of-reason
approach to extra-territorial price-fixing arrangements.m However in
view of the position of the Justice Department that possibility is
extremely slim.
The Justice Department is convinced that the rule of per se illegality
applicable to domestic price fixing arrangements is equally applicable
to foreign commerce whenever there is a direct and substantial effect
upon United States imports or interstate commerce. 23 Aside from the
limited situation in which an extra-territorial attempt to fix prices on
American imports or interstate commerce is unsuccessful, the present
approach of the courts is quite favorable to the Department. The
difficulty of proof in attempt cases probably minimizes the impact
of that limited loophole. This factor, and the possibility that a switch
to the more conservative interpretation of the protective principle in
that limited situation might spawn a rule-of-reason approach to extraterritorial price-fixing arrangements generally, 20 both render it unlikely
197. Supra note 191 and accompanying text.
198. Fashion Originators' Guild v. F.T.C., 312 U.S. 457 (1941); United States v.
Aluminum Co., supra note 193; The Gray Line, Inc. v. Gray Line Sightseeing Cos.
Associated, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. (1966 Trade Cas.) ff 71,704 (N.D. Calif. 1965).
199. United States v. Aluminum Co., supra note 193, at 443.
200. Id. at 444.
201. Compare note 175 supraand accompanying text.
202. Compare note 155 supra and accompanying text.
203. Orrick, supranote 171.
204. See note 202 supra and accompanying text.
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that the Justice Department will attempt to fill that loophole.2 5
Returning to the first alternative proposed by the Colombian firm
in the above hypothetical-that the Latin American joint venture

would agree not to sell gasoline on the American market below the
prevailing price level at the time of the sale-the position of the courts

and the Justice Department would preclude acceptance by the
American corporation. The proposal is one to fix prices on American
imports, illegal per se under the Sherman Act. The economic and
business justifications that could be advanced in favor of the arrange-

ment would not be considered by the courts. Nor would the reasonableness of fixing the price at the prevailing price level justify the
proposal.
If either arrangement will solve the American corporation's dilemma,
it must be the second ancillary agreement.

3. The Second Ancillary Agreement-Market Division.-Standing
alone, domestic agreements to allocate portions of the American
market between competitors are per se violations of the Sherman
Act. 20 6 Similarly, quota arrangements whereby competitors restrict
the supply of goods they offer for sale in a given section of the
United States are forbidden.2 0 7 Only where these arrangements are
reasonably necessary and ancillary to the assignment of a valid patent,
trademark or secret process do the courts recognize a limited exception
to the per se rule.2 °8

The classic case of per se illegality in foreign commerce is the
0
cartel arrangement allocating European and United States markets. 2°
205. It is unlikely that Donald F. Turner's recent remarks, indicating a more liberal
approach toward arrangements ancillary to joint ventures, see note 215 infra, were
meant to apply to ancillary price-fixing arrangements. The Justice Department, like
the courts, is simply not equipped to police price-fixing arrangements.
206. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., supra note 185. Accord, White
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963) (dictum); Timken Roller Bearing
Co. v. United States, supra note 194 (dictum).
207. United States v. Aluminum Co., supra note 193 (implied); United States
v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, supra note 195 (implied).
208. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del.
1955), aff'd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (license of patent); Denison Mattress Factory v.
Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1962) (license of patent). This exception has
two major limitations: (1) the territorial restrictions may not be more restrictive than
necessary to accomplish a legitimate primary objective, The Gray Line, Inc. v. Gray
Line Sightseeing Cos. Associated, Inc., supra note 198; and (2) the object to which
the territorial arrangements are ancillary must be the primary motivation for the
arrangements, see Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., supra note 208, at 409
(dicta).
209. Brewster, The Influence of International Factors, PaRSPEcnrvEs ON ANTMUST
PoLicy 358 (Phillips ed. 1965). See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,
supra note 194; United States National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D. N.Y. 1945,
aff'd per curiam, 332 U.S. 319 (1947); United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland
Information Center, 133 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).

1966]

NOTES

When the cartel element is removed the same rule applies to the
naked agreement between American and foreign producers to allocate

world markets. 210 The protective principle is responsible for only

one exception to this rule2 11 Where a domestic producer agrees to

refrain from competing in a foreign market no violation of section
one of the Sherman Act occurs; no legitimate United States interest
has been injured. 212 Whether the domestic exception to the per se
rule, where the arrangement is reasonably necessary and ancillary to a
vast patent, trademark or secret process, will be extended to the
foreign commerce arena is still an open question.213 Commentators
generally believe that such an extension is probable; one has gone
so far as to suggest that the exception might be expanded to include
territorial arrangements which are reasonably necessary and ancillary
2i4
to the transfer of capital or technology to underdeveloped countries.
210. United States v. Learner Co., supra note 193 (exporters of scrap metal from
the west coast of the United States allocated supply territories among themselves and
excluded other potential exporters); United States v. R. P. Oldham Co., supra note
193 (Japanese nail importers allocated sales territories in the United States); United
States v. General Dyestuff Corp., 57 F. Supp. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (reciprocal agreement between a European and an American producer not to infringe upon each other's
market).
211. For a general discussion of the protective principle see notes 115-27 supra and
accompanying text.
212. Alfred Bell & Co., Ltd., v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., supra note 194, although
not precisely in point, held that agreements to restrict outputs for sale in Great Britain
and Ireland did not violate section 1 of the Sherman Act because they did not affect
sales in the United States. Clearly, the same principle would apply to territorial
divisions which affect only foreign markets. Accord, Brewster, supra note 209, at 358.
213. Open at least, to the extent that the holding in United States v. Pan American
World Airways, 193 F. Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 371 U.S.
296 (1963), is not solid precedent due to the subsequent reversal on the ground that
the Civil Aeronautics Board had exclusive original jurisdiction, see note 83 supra.
That case held that the original use of territorial arrangements ancillary to the establishment of a joint venture to supply an air-freight line to the southern coast of
South America was reasonable. However, after the venture had been established, the
use of territorial arrangements to thwart its efforts to expand violated section 1 of the
Sherman Act. 193 F. Supp. at 32-36. Of like import is United States v. General Dyestuff
Corp., supra note 210, apparently the first case discussing the ancillary doctrine in a
foreign commerce context. There the American defendants contended that their
territorial agreements were ancillary to the sale of their foreign business in European
concerns. The court held that the primary purpose of the arrangements was the
avoidance of competition, after assuming, arguendo, that the arrangement was "lawful
when severed from their . . . [unlawful] purpose and object." Id. at 645. United
States v. National Lead Co., supra note 209, reached the same result in another
situation where the anticompetitive motive was paramount. Subsequent cases rejecting
the ancillary doctrine have all involved situations in which the paramount motives
were anticompetitive, see, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, supra note
194; United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y.
1952). Certainly, on the basis of the foregoing case-law, one can make a strong
argument in favor of applying the ancillary doctrine to foreign commerce in the
same manner and to the same extent that courts apply it to interstate commerce.
Compare note 208 supra and accompanying text.
214. Ba sTFa, op. cit. supra note 181, at 448.
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The official statements of Justice Department personnel offer little

assistance to one seeking information regarding their approach to
territorial restrictions in foreign commerce. 215 Yet in view of the

case-law, one should expect the Department to view such arrangements with a jaundiced eye whenever they eliminate foreign competi-

216
tors from the domestic market.
In view of the uncertain status of the law, the American corporation
in our hypothetical would be ill-advised to accept the second alternative proposed by the Colombian firm.

B. The Impact of United States Antitrust Laws-Actual and Imagined
Turning from this examination of the position of the courts and

the Justice Department, the question now asked is whether the foregoing legal principles prohibit or discourage the use of foreign

joint ventures or price-fixing and market division arrangements ancillary to foreign joint ventures.
In view of the foregoing analysis, it is not surprising to learn that

few business-motivated joint ventures are deterred by antitrust considerations.217 The Wall Street Journal is reporting daily instances
where American corporations and foreign concerns are joining forces
in foreign operations 218 In 1965, one hundred and thirteen of the

one hundred and seventy-one recorded joint ventures were of the latter
215. In fact, the official statements are somewhat inconsistent. In a recent speech,
Donald F. Turner, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, made
these two apparently inconsistent statements. "[I]t is certainly appropriate to make
sure that any agreement entered into by the parents in connection therewith are no
more restrictive than necessary to the launching and operation of the venture." He
then addressed himself to territorial arrangements specifically. "I am frank to say that
so far I am not convinced that territorial restrictions are reasonably necessary to any
legitimate purpose save for one case, that involving the entry of new firms and/or
the introduction of new products." Turner, supra note 172. While at first blush one
might conclude that the second statement would justify the use of territorial arrangements ancillary to joint ventures in underdeveloped countries, yet this conclusion
seems to stretch Mr. Turner's words too far. His limited concession seems merely
to evidence a willingness to sacrifice competition in the short run in order to advance
the interests of the American consumer in the long run.
216. Orrick, supranote 171.
217. Brewster, supra note 209, at 366. There may be some concern that the position
of the Justice Department may take a more restrictive turn in the future, see Celler, A
Congressman'sView of the Foreign Commerce Aspects of the Sherman Act, Symposium
on Trade Associations, 27 A.B.A. ANmusr SE:c. 1 at 6 (1965). Yet in view of the
desirability of investment in underdeveloped countries, such a change is unlikely with
respect to joint ventures in Latin America, see Friedmann, Antitrust Law and Joint
International Business Ventures in Economically Undeveloped Countries, 60 CoLum.
L. REv. 780, 785 (1960).
218. See, e.g., Wall Street Journal, Feb. 15, 1966, p. 11, col. 1 (Guinean joint
venture between American corporation and the government of Guinea); Wall Street
Journal, Jan. 24, 1966, p. 22, col. 2 (Puerto Rican joint venture between American
corporation and French company); Wall Street Journal, Jan. 5, 1966, p. 9, col. 2
(Mexican joint venture between American corporation and Mexican concern).
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Yet, as that figure suggests, joint ventures between com-

peting American corporations for foreign operations have been rare.
While there seems to be no reason to doubt the legality of such
arrangements where they produce goods for sale in foreign markets
only, the possibility that the Justice Department might conclude that
the joint venture is a potential competitor for American markets has
evidently led many American corporations to decide against such
joint ventures. 220 In view of the Justice Department's current conviction that Latin American joint ventures rarely compete for American
markets, some of that hesitancy appears unwarranted. 221 Aside from
the limited situations where competing American corporations combine in a foreign joint venture for the purpose of export to the United
States, or where the joint venture is accompanied by other more
restrictive arrangements, the antitrust laws should have no actual
impact on the decision to enter a business motivated joint venture in
Latin America.
In contrast the impact of antitrust considerations on the use of
price-fixing and territorial arrangements has been substantial. In
view of the existing case law regarding price-fixing and the uncertain
legal status of ancillary territorial arrangements, 2 3 it is not surprising
to find that antitrust considerations absolutely deter agreements
between American corporations and foreign competitors (whether
they be a joint venture in which the American corporation has an
interest or entirely independent) to fix prices on American imports
or to limit those imports in any way.22 Moreover, where a foreign
joint venture with foreign interests is likely to compete for American
markets at an advantage over the American corporation, American
corporations have refrained from entering such ventures because of
219. TP-DE REG. REP. No. 240 3(1966).
220. BrEwsTEP, op. cit. supra note 181, at 272-73.
221. At the 1964 hearings on foreign trade and the antitrust laws, several instances
were brought to the attention of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly
where antitrust considerations had allegedly deterred joint ventures between competing
American corporations.

Persen, Hart Committee Hearings 52-54.

With only three

exceptions (cases X, XII & XIII), the instances referred to involved situations where
the American corporation wanted to use additional, more restrictive arrangements to
avoid competition from the foreign joint venture. Of the three exceptions, cases XII
and XIII seem to be based upon erroneous legal advice; neither case involved joint
ventures likely to compete in American markets. In case X the decision not to invest
followed a Justice Department dispensation containing too many restrictions to be
useful. In view of the intended scope of the venture, the need for dispensation was
questionable.
221. See textual discussion following note 176 supra.
222. See textual discussion following note 205 supra.
223. See textual discussion following note 216 supra.
224. Persen, supranote 221.
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their legal inability to protect themselves with price-fixing or territorial
225
agreements.
VI. THE CONFLICt -AND ITS RESOLUTION
The existence of an actual conflict between our antitrust policies
and our foreign policy objectives in Latin America is apparent from
the foregoing examination. However, before approaching alternative
resolutions, a clear definition of the nature of that conflict is needed.
A. The Nature of Conflict
Parts I and II illustrated the risks of Latin American investment
prohibiting intelligently managed American corporations from committing all of their assets to business operations in those countries.
While some of our domestic corporations are large enough to
finance a small venture in Latin America without committing an
inordinate percentage of their capital, most are not. The small to
medium size corporations represent a large segment of the American
reservoir of private capital, technological skill, and management
expertise which could be used to advance our foreign policy objectives
in Latin America. Yet in order for these smaller firms to take part
in this endeavor, they must be permitted to share the risks. Where
partnership with Latin American interests is not possible, the ability
of these corporations to combine a portion of their resources with
other interested American corporations is a prerequisite to any effective contribution by this important segment of our economy. The
community of interest necessary for such joint efforts is most likely
to exist between corporations in similar lines of endeavor. Yet Parts
IV and V illustrated that joint ventures between American competitors
are absolutely deterred by antitrust considerations. To the extent
that this deterrent prevents a realization of the fullest potentials of
the American corporation's role in the development of Latin America,
a conflict exists.
While Part III of this paper did indicate that foreign participation
often permits smaller American corporations to enter Latin America
without combining with an American competitor, it also indicated
that such ventures are likely to compete for American markets at
an advantage over their American parent. Part V illustrated how
the inability of American corporations to protect themselves from
this threat of competition without running afoul of the antitrust laws
poses another obstacle to the full realization of the potentials of the
225. Ibid. See also discussion in note 221 supra.
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American corporation in the economic development of Latin America.
Here again, a conflict exists.
B. Alternative Resolutions and Recommendations
The resolution of this conflict involves the reconciliation of competing policies. On the one hand, the United States seeks to remove
all unreasonable restraints from its trade relations with the rest of
the world. On the other, the United States seeks to promote the
economic development of the Latin American countries so that they
may eventually engage in world trade on a competitive basis. Only
when those two policies actually conflict must a reconciliation be
made.
This paper has searched a broad context but has discovered only two
specific instances of conflict. On this basis the only justifiable approach
to reconciliation is to make whatever specific adjustments are necessary
to eliminate those limited instances of conflict.=
1. The First Instance of Conflict-ForeignJoint Ventures Between
American Competitors.-No one will question the desirability from a
foreign policy viewpoint of allowing competing American corporations
to enter business-motivated foreign joint ventures for the purpose of
supplying Latin American markets. Nor are there any serious objections to such arrangements from an antitrust point of view; there is no
adverse effect on either the American consumer's access to foreign
competition or the American businessman's access to foreign markets.
226. No responsible sentiment urges a blank exclusion of foreign commerce from
the operation of American antitrust laws. Celler, supra note 217, at 5. "Do . . .
[those who would restrict the application of the antitrust laws to foreign commerce]
genuinely believe that Congress will permit agreements of private business to control
the extent of our foreign trade without at the same time subjecting such agreements
to controls more stringent and pervasive than the prohibitions of the existing antitrust
laws? To me the probable Congressional response is clear." Orrick, Address by
William H. Orrick, Jr., the former Assistant Attorney General in Charge of the
Antitrust Division, before the Quarterly Meeting of the United States Inter-American
Council, Inc., in New York City, Dec. 7, 1964. But see Hass, Economic Peace
Through Private Agreements, Harv. Bus. Rev., 1944, p. 139. To do so would
promote an infinite number of restraints on world trade at a time when the world is
striving desperately for a freer flow of international commerce. 1 KiRscHEN, EcoNoNUc
Poucv iN OuR Timm 113 (Kirschen ed. 1964). Moreover, our current policy encouraging competition in foreign commerce is quite apposite to commerce between the
United States and the developed countries of the world, see note 78 supra and accompanying text.
While this last statement seems to suggest an antitrust exclusion for commerce
between the United States and the underdeveloped nations of the world, even that
approach would go too far. Clearly, our foreign policy toward these countries indicates
an awareness that something more than cooperative competition is needed. Yet from
that alone, it does not follow that our antitrust laws should not apply at all. The
immediate problem is to determine how much more than the natural forces of competition is necessary.
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In fact, the present state of the law under United States antitrust
statutes indicate that such joint ventures are lawful. Even the justice
Department, with its insistence upon a direct and substantial effect on
American commerce, is unlikely to question them.
Evidently the existing deterrent is a result of over-cautious legal
advice. To the extent that this is true, a better informed antitrust bar
is the only practicable solution to this aspect of conflict between our
antitrust laws and our foreign policy-this conflict exists only in the
minds of the business community.
However, where the foreign joint venture between American competitors is to compete for United States markets, an actual conflict
arises. Once again the value of such arrangements to our foreign
policy objectives in Latin America is clear. Yet in this case there is
room for objection based upon antitrust policy. While these joint
ventures do create an additional source of supply for the American
consumer, and to that extent intensify competition they do have an
inherent potential for eliminating competition. Nevertheless, until
that potential is utilized, the obvious values of this type of arrangement
both in terms of antitrust and foreign policy ought to vindicate them
in the eyes of the law.
If such vindication is to occur, some clarification of the existing
case-law is essential. The more liberal approach taken by many
American courts promises to remove the antitrust deterrent now facing
such ventures. Yet, unless something more is done, the obstinacy of
some courts will continue to discourage this type of arrangement for
some time to come.
Legislative clarification is needed now. However, this type of legislation presents difficult drafting problems. If such legislation is
couched in terms that are too specific, the courts may bd tempted to
treat them as rules rather than guides. If broad standards, such as
"reasonably necessary," are used, courts will continue in their present
state of confusion as to the factors which ought to be considered.
Any successful clarifying legislation must be preceded by an
analysis of the source of confusion. The divergence between the two
judicial approaches to foreign joint ventures results from their variant
interpretations of the protective principle. Some take the position
that the protective principle requires a consideration of all factors
having a legitimate bearing upon the United States' interest in applying its antitrust legislation to a given foreign operation. This interpretation results in something like a rule of reason approach to foreign
joint ventures. Others take the position that the protective principle
requires merely that the joint venture have a direct and substantial
effect upon United States' commerce. This mechanical interpretation

NOTES
of the protective principle exposes the foreign joint venture to the
confused state of domestic law whenever a direct and substantial
effect upon American commerce exists.
The foregoing analysis suggests a solution to the clarification
problem. A legislative definition of the protective principle and its
proper application to foreign joint ventures would place all of our
courts on the same track. This sort of clarifying legislation does not
involve the codification of rules which may tempt courts to take a
mechanical approach. Nor does it miss the source of confusion as
would a broad standard. Instead it focuses the courts' attention on the
pertinent issue-does the United States have a substantial interest in
applying its antitrust laws to this extra-territorial conduct?
A legislative definition of the protective principle should attempt to
codify the interpretation of the more conservative American courts.
That is, consideration ought to be given to all factors, not just the
effect upon United States commerce, which have a legitimate bearing
upon the United States' interest in applying its antitrust laws to a
given foreign operation. This approach is most consistent with the
rationale behind the protective principle. Whenever the United States
extends its legislative jurisdiction beyond its borders that extension
must be justified. The protective principle justifies such an extension
only when it is necessary in order to protect a substantial national
interest. Its applicability depends, therefore, upon the existence of at
threat to some substantial United States interest. In order for our
courts to make an intelligent assessment of the national interest
threatened by a foreign joint venture, they must consider all relevant
factors. If they could pick and choose the factors to be considered,
American courts could conceivably extend the legislative jurisdiction
of the United States to extra-territorial conduct having only incidental
connections with our country. If this approach were taken by the
courts of all nations, the existing international legal structure built
upon concepts of legislative jurisdiction would crumble.
A draft of the legislative definition of the protective principle is
annexed to this paper. This legislation would seem to eliminate the
existing confusion regarding the legal status of Latin American joint
ventures between American competitors to exploit United States
markets. Clearly, unless such joint ventures are actually used to
eliminate competition in American markets, the United States has no
legitimate interest in applying its antitrust laws to this type of extraterritorial conduct.
2. The Second Instance of Conflict-Ancillary Protective Arrangements.-Due to the interchangeability of price-fixing and market
allocation arrangements the following discussion will treat them to-
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gether. A change in the law permitting either arrangement would
eliminate the conflict arising because of American corporations' legal
inability to protect themselves from the threat of competition from
Latin American joint ventures involving local participation.
A resolution of this instance of conflict is difficult because of its
intensity. From a foreign policy standpoint, the use of one of these
ancillary arrangements is desirable to the extent that it is necessary
to encourage Latin American joint ventures between American corporations and foreign interests. Yet both arrangements fly in the face
of our antitrust policies when they affect the prices on or the
quality of United States imports.
To the extent that the courts are able to separate those ancillary
arrangements that are reasonably necessary to encourage Latin
American joint ventures between American corporations and foreign
interests from those that are not, the intensity of this conflict is
reduced. Of course, existing precedents do not permit such case-bycase resolutions of this policy conflict. Yet, before releasing the
courts from the bonds of precedent, their ability to separate the
"sheep from the goats" must be considered.
The rationale of the rule of per se illegality presently applied to
ancillary price-fixing arrangements was born of necessity; courts
found themselves unable to separate the reasonable from the not-soreasonable price-fixing arrangements. This was primarily due to the
difficulty of determining the reasonableness of a given price in a
constantly changing market. This rationale seems to apply with
equal force whether the arrangement be ancillary to a foreign or
domestic joint venture. Perhaps these same considerations are the
basis for the similar absolute prohibitions against price-fixing in European and many Latin American countries. In view of the inability of
courts to separate the "sheep from the goats" in this type of situation,
a change in the existing law is undesirable.
In contrast, courts have had little difficulty separating reasonable
territorial arrangements from those which are unreasonable or unnecessary as ancillary to legitimate business endeavors. Dealing with
market allocations involves some of the complex economic analysis
necessary in determining the reasonableness of prices. The general
acceptance of ancillary territorial arrangements by European and
Latin American countries has resulted from the ease of preventing
their abuse. United States courts should be released from those
precedents which prohibit a case-by-case analysis of ancillary territorial arrangements.
A reinterpretation of the protective principle as applied to such
arrangements when ancillary to foreign joint ventures would release
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the courts from the bonds of precedent and permit a case-by-case
reconciliation of the present conflict between the antitrust policies
and foreign policies. Application of the conservative interpretation of
the protective principle renders the rule of per se illegality unnecessary. As a prerequisite to the application of any antitrust principle,
the courts would have to consider countervailing economic and
business considerations, such as the value of the arrangement in
furthering United States economic objectives in Latin America. If in
the face of all such considerations, the court can fairly conclude that
the United States has a substantial interest in applying its antitrust
laws, the arrangement has already had the benefit of what is in essence
a rule of reason evaluation.
Of course, this solution does not resolve the conflict entirely. The
proposed statute would not add a great deal of certainty to the
legal status of these arrangements.
On the other hand, the way is now open for an intelligent resolution
of this conflict by the courts. The applicable legal principles would
be clear, and the relevant considerations would be apparent. Once
the courts begin to recognize the conflict and resolve it intelligently,
one thing will be certain: Latin American joint ventures and market
allocation arrangements reasonably necessary and ancillary to such
ventures will not run afoul of United States antitrust laws if they are
motivated by the desire to invest in Latin America's economic growth
and are designed with a view toward restraining competition only so
far as necessary to make investment worthwhile.
JAmms H. HANCoCK

Appendix
PROPOSED STATUTE

Applicability of United States Antitrust Legislation to Foreign Joint Ventures and
Market Allocation Arrangements Reasonably Necessary and Ancillary Thereto
I. United States antitrust legislation shall not be applied to foreign joint ventures
between United States concerns or between United States concerns and foreign
concerns unless the United States is shown to have a substantial economic interest in
applying its antitrust legislation to such joint ventures.
II. United States antitrust legislation shall not be applied to market allocation arrangements reasonably necessary and ancillary to foreign joint ventures between United
States concerns or between United States concerns and foreign concerns unless the
United States is shown to have a substantial economic interest in applying its antitrust
legislation to such arrangements.
III. For purposes of I and II, a foreign joint venture includes all joint operations
organized and operated within any country or territory other than the United States
or its territories or possessions.
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IV. In determining whether the United States has a substantial economic interest in
applying its antitrust legislation to a foreign joint venture included in I or to an
ancillary market allocation arrangement included in II, all factors having a legitimate
bearing on that interest shall be considered.
V. For purposes of IV, factors having a legitimate bearing on the United State's
economic interest may include, but shall not be limited to: (1) the actual or potential
effect of the joint venture or its ancillary market allocation arrangement on competition
in the interstate commerce of the United States; (2) the actual or potential effects of
the joint venture or its ancillary market allocation arrangement on the access of
United States business to foreign markets; (3) the actual or potential effects of the
joint venture or its ancillary market allocation arrangement on the access of foreign
business to United States markets; and (4) the actual or potential effects of the
joint venture or its ancillary market allocation arrangement on any other economic
objective of the United States.

